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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JACOB ROSS HALE, : Case No. 990939-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), and Aggravated Kidnaping, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999), 
in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (j) (1996) . See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's motion for a mistrial where a juror overheard a 
bailiff yell out "guilty, guilty, guilty!", thereby impacting her 
ability and the ability of other jurors to sit as impartial fact 
finders and lending an air of impropriety to the proceeding? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's denial of a motion for 
a new trial, which is in effect a mistrial motion, will not be 
overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. We presume 
the trial court exercised proper discretion unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 
224, 225 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
II. Did the trial court violate Appellant's due process 
rights in refusing to suppress unreliable and tainted eyewitness 
identification evidence where its findings in support of the 
reliability of such evidence are legally insufficient? 
Standard of Review: "'The constitutionality of an 
identification procedure presents a mixed question of fact and 
law.1 On review, we give no deference to the trial court's 
determination that defendant's due process rights were not 
violated; however, we presume that the factual findings 
underlying that determination are correct." State v. Parra, 972 
P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Mincy, 838 
P.2d 648, 657 (Utah App.1992)). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Jacob Ross Hale's ("Hale") motion to suppress the 
eyewitness identification is preserved on the record for appeal 
("R.") at 246. His motion for a new trial is preserved at R.247 
[116-144] . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are dispositive of 
the issues on appeal. Their texts are provided in Addendum B. 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution; 
Article I, Section 10, Utah Constitution; 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution; 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution; 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Hale was charged by information with one count of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1999), and one count of Aggravated Kidnaping, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) . 
R.5-6. An arrest warrant issued. R.l. 
After a preliminary hearing in which the victim, Mitch Lewis 
("Lewis"), identified Hale as one of his assailants, and then 
testified about his identification of Hale from a photo array and 
live line-up, R.245, Hale moved to suppress Lewis1 identifi-
cation. The trial court denied the motion. R.246[41-45]. 
Halefs case was set for trial. R.247. Before trial 
commenced, Hale moved for a mistrial on the basis that a juror 
overheard a bailiff state "guilty, guilty, guilty." R.247 [116-
44]. The court denied his motion. R.247[144]. The trial went 
forward, and Hale was convicted as charged. R.170,247. Hale 
timely appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress Lewis1 
identification and from the denied motion for a mistrial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 19, 1999, around 11:00 a.m., Mitch Lewis ("Lewis") 
sat in his white honda in Sugarhouse Park eating lunch and 
reading the paper. R.247[146-52]. He glanced into the rearview 
mirror and saw two men walking toward his car. R.247[152]. He 
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went back to his paper, then glanced up again as the men passed 
within two to three feet of his car. R.247[153]. Lewis resumed 
reading, then looked up to see the men turn and approach his car 
after they walked about 100 feet beyond it. R.247[154]. The 
next time he looked at the men, they were standing outside his 
driver's side window. R.247[154]. 
Lewis described the men as white males, 18 to 20 years old, 
5f10ff or 5fllff tall. R.247[153,155]. They wore baggy pants 
and white tank tops. R.247[153]. One man had dark hair, a 
goatee, mustache and sunglasses. R.247[155]. The other, later 
identified as Justin Dongarra ("Dongarra") , had red hair and a 
red goatee. R.247[155]. 
The dark haired man asked Lewis where "Play It Again Sports" 
was located. R.247[156]. Lewis said he did not know. R.247 
[156] . The dark haired man revealed a gun and said, "well, 
you're going to take us there." R.247[156]. He ordered Lewis to 
unlock his door; Lewis complied. R.247[157]. The man then 
ordered Lewis out of the car. R.247[158]. Lewis stood by the 
man for a few moments. R.247[158]. Dongarra went to the front 
passenger side and rummaged through Lewis1 belongings on the 
seat, including his wallet. R.247[157]. He took the cash that 
he found in the wallet. R.247[161]. 
With the gun still trained on Lewis, the dark haired man and 
Lewis got into the back seat; Dongarra got into the driver's 
seat. R.247[159]. Dongarra drove for one hour, eventually 
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heading east toward the canyons. R.247[160,173]. Dongarra drove 
into the Olympus Cove area and suggested that they stop. 
R.247[160]. The other man said, "no . . . people will hear 
shots" and insisted that they go into Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
R.247[163]. 
Meanwhile, the dark haired man, still pointing the gun at 
Lewis, went through Lewis1 wallet. R.247[161]. He removed 
Lewis1 driver's license. R.247[161]. Noting Lewis1 address, he 
said, "I know where you live." R.247[161]. He took Lewis credit 
cards and asked Lewis for the pin numbers. R.247[161]. He told 
Lewis that the numbers had better be correct. R.247[162]. He 
asked Lewis if he had seen the movie "Pulp Fiction" and 
threatened that he would shoot Lewis in the leg if he tried to 
escape. R.247 [163] . 
During the drive, Lewis avoided looking at the men so as not 
to anger them. R.247[190]. He focused on the gun pointed at him 
or looked for opportunities to escape. R.247[191-92]. He saw 
the dark haired man's face in profile. R.247[193]. The man wore 
sunglasses. R.247[194]. Lewis saw his eyes underneath the 
sunglasses and noticed his slow manner of blinking. R.247[195]. 
The men drove five miles up Big Cottonwood Canyon, 
eventually stopping by the side of the road. R.247[164-65]. The 
dark haired man handed the gun to Dongarra, telling him to keep 
it on Lewis. R.247[166-67]. He asked Lewis if he had a tire 
iron in the trunk. R.247[167]. The man exited the car and 
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looked in the trunk. R.247[167]. 
The man took the gun back from Dongarra and ordered Lewis 
out of the car. R.247[168]. Dongarra drove away. R.247[171]. 
The man ordered Lewis down a ravine, following behind. 
R.247 [168,170] . Lewis did not see the man while descending 
because he was concentrating on keeping a foothold on the steep, 
rocky, snow-covered terrain. R.247[197]. The man ordered Lewis 
to sit on a rock. R.247[171]. The man stood three to five feet 
away. R.247[171]. 
Lewis and the man stayed in the ravine for one hour until 
Dongarra returned. R.247[173,199] . At that point, the man 
ordered Lewis further down the ravine. R.247[174]. He told 
Lewis to remove his shoes and throw them in the distance. 
R.247 [174]. He warned Lewis to stay put for twenty minutes and 
left. R.247[176]. The entire encounter between Lewis and the 
men lasted about over two hours. R.247[173]. 
Lewis found his shoes and walked up to the road. 
R.247[176]. A passing motorist picked him up. Id. Lewis 
explained what happened and the motorist urged him to call the 
police. Id. Lewis refused, explaining that he was scared that 
his assailants would retaliate against him. Id. The motorist 
convinced Lewis to call the police, however, on his cell phone. 
R.247[177] . 
Lewis spoke with police the same day in a friend1s office. 
R.247[177]. Lewis told the police that he was so traumatized 
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that he could not give a description of his assailants. 
R.247 [202]. Eventually, however, he gave the police a general 
description, omitting the fact that the dark haired man had a 
goatee. R.247[201]. 
Ten days later, Lewis viewed a photo array in the office of 
Detective Timmerman ("Timmerman"). R.247[178]. The twelve 
photos were of six men with dark hair, of the same race, similar 
age and coloring. R.247[179,202]. Timmerman told Lewis the 
suspect may not be in the array. Id. Lewis identified Hale, 
saying he was ninety percent sure. R.247[179,203]. Timmerman 
responded that he picked the right person. R.247[203]. 
Lewis viewed a live line-up on May 4, 1999, at the jail. 
R.247 [180]. The line-up consisted of eight men. R.247[181]. 
Lewis was given an instruction card explaining that the suspect 
may not be in the line-up. Id. Initially, Lewis thought that 
his assailant was not in the line-up. R.247[204]. He then 
focused on the blinking of the men, and thereby identified Hale 
through a process of elimination. R.247[204-05]. 
Hale moved to suppress Lewis1 identification of Hale as 
unreliable on account of the fearful situation in which it was 
made and Lewis1 inability to actually view the man. R.246[39-
41]. He similarly argued that the line-up identification was 
unreliable because it was tainted by Detective Timmerman!s 
statement at the previous photo array confirming that he had the 
right man. Id. The trial court denied Hale's motion, finding 
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the identification to be constitutionally reliable and therefore 
suitable for the jury. R.246[41-45]. A Long instruction was 
submitted to the jury. See Jury Instruction No. 26 (included in 
jury instruction packet in unpaginated envelope in appellate 
record). 
After the jury for Hale's trial was empaneled, but before 
trial commenced, the jury was standing by the courthouse 
elevator. R.247[116]. Two bailiffs, Officers Neil Twitchell 
("Twitchell") and Manuel Galloway ("Galloway"), were standing 
nearby, engaged in a conversation. R.247[129-31]. Twitchell 
stated, "It's a good thing when they put the jury together that 
they don't instruct them on guilty, guilty, guilty.'7 R.247[130]. 
Galloway responded in a loud voice "guilty, guilty, guilty!" 
R.247 [131]. An attorney who was a co-worker of defense counsel 
overheard the exchange and notified the court. R.247[116]. 
The judge asked the jury as a group if they heard any 
remarks made by court personnel while standing by the elevator. 
R.247[119]. One juror replied, "[I heard] something to the 
effect of - 'they are guilty.' I'm not sure who said it, but 
somebody yelled it out.". R.247[120]. The juror said she 
understood the comment as a joke that did not pertain to Hale's 
case. Id. She assured that it would not interfere with her 
ability to sit as an impartial juror. R.247[120-21] . She also 
said that she did not discuss the remark with other jurors. 
R.247[120-22]. The other jurors denied hearing the remark. 
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R.247[131] . 
The judge excused the jury and called in Twitchell and 
Galloway. R.247[124,129]. They admitted to the conversation, 
but asserted that they were generalized comments. R.247[130-31]. 
Twitchell stated that he did not recognize the people by the 
elevator as the jury for Hale's case, and was not aware that they 
overheard the remarks. R.247[130,131]. 
Hale moved for a mistrial, arguing that the statement 
tainted the jury. R.247[133-34]. He noted that it was uttered 
by a uniformed officer inside the courthouse, thereby giving the 
statement greater impact. R.247[134]. He further noted that 
neither a curative instruction nor the juror's assurance that she 
would sit impartially could cure the taint. R.247[133]. The 
court denied the motion. R.247[144]. No curative instruction 
was requested or given. See Jury Instruction Packet (included in 
unpaginated envelope in appellate record). 
At trial, the State presented Tamara Douglas ("Douglas") as 
a witness in addition to Mr. Lewis. R.247[217-34]. Douglas 
testified that she is Dongarra's girlfriend, and was at the time 
of the incident. R.247[218]. She stated that Dongarra, Douglas, 
and she were at Lisa Salazar's ("Salazar") house at 10:00 a.m. or 
12:30 to 1:00 p.m. R.247[220,232]. Dongarra and Hale left 
together an hour to hour-and-a-half later. R.247[221]. Hale 
carried a .22 automatic handgun. R.247[222]. 
According to Douglas, Dongarra and Hale returned at 10:00 
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p.m. in a white honda. R.247[223]. Dongarra drove the car. 
Dongarraf Salazar and Douglas went together in the car to a bank. 
R.247[224]. Douglas withdrew $300 from an ATM using a stolen 
credit card that Dongarra gave her. R.247[223-24]. They 
returned to Salazarfs house. R.247[225]. Dongarra left in the 
car again, then returned 45 minutes later with Hale. R.247[226]. 
Douglas admitted that she knew the car and credit cards in 
Dongarra's possession were stolen. R.247[231,234]. 
Douglas testified that she, Dongarra, Hale and Salazar 
abandoned the car in a canyon above Copperton a few days later. 
R.247 [227]. Dongarra and Hale wiped their fingerprints from the 
car and removed the tires. R.247[228]. Lori Snarr, also a 
witness for the State, confirmed that she found a white honda 
abandoned in the canyon, explaining that there were no people 
around the car when she found it. R.247[214-15]. 
Douglas offered her testimony in exchange for a grant of 
immunity from prosecution for her fraudulent use of the stolen 
credit cards. R.247[217,229]; see Immunity Grant and Agreement 
(State Exhibit No. 9 contained in unpaginated envelope included 
in appellate record). She was aware that a fraud conviction 
carried with it a prison term and thousands of dollars in fines. 
R.247 [230]. She was also aware that the State could revoke the 
offer if she did not testify truthfully in furtherance of its 
case against Hale. R.247[229-30]. She also stated that she knew 
Hale, but did not get along with him. R.247[228]. 
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Hale presented two alibi witnesses, Salazar and Colby Arnn 
("Arnn"). R.247[239-71]. Hale also testified. R.248[25-48]. 
Salazar stated that she and Hale were boyfriend and girlfriend on 
March 19, 1999. R.247[239]. Douglas, Dongarra and Salazar were 
at Salazarfs house at 10:45-11:00 a.m. that day. R.247[242], 
248 [28]. Dongarra left, then Hale arrived. R.247[243]. 
Dongarra returned at 12:00-1:00 p.m. with a white honda that he 
said he bought for $500. R.247[245]. 
Salazar stated that Dongarra and Douglas dropped her and 
Hale off at Arnn's apartment. R.247[247]. She and Hale remained 
there until 4:00 p.m. playing video games. R.247[248-51]. They 
left briefly to walk to a convenience store for something to 
drink. R.247[251]. Dongarra and Douglas returned to Arnn's 
apartment and picked them up. R.247[251]. 
Arnn confirmed that Salazar and Hale spent the afternoon at 
his apartment, arriving at 1:45 p.m. R.247[267]. He said they 
remained until 4:00 p.m. playing video games, except for a brief 
period when they walked to the convenience store. R.247[268-
69] . 
According to Salazar, Douglas and Dongarra dropped her and 
Hale at Hale!s house for a few hours. R.247[252-53]. They met 
up again at 7:00 p.m. R.247[253]. All four people went to a 7-
11, where Douglas used a stolen credit card to make a purchase. 
R.247[253-54] . 
Hale similarly testified that he went to Salazarfs house at 
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11:00 a.m. on March 19, 1999. R.248[28], Dongarra and Douglas 
were there. R.248[29]. Dongarra left ten minutes later. 
R.248[30]. He returned at 1:00 p.m. with the white honda. 
R.248[31]. Dongarra told Hale that the car was stolen. 
R.248[32,45] . Dongarra, Hale and Douglas left in the car and 
went to a bank where Douglas withdrew money from the ATM using 
the stolen credit card. R.248[33-34]. They returned to 
Salazar's house and picked her up. R.248[34]. Dongarra drove 
them to Arnn's apartment, where he left Hale and Salazar at 1:30 
p.m.. R.248[35]. He and Salazar remained at Arnn's until 4:00 
p.m., when Douglas and Dongarra returned to pick them up. R.248 
[41] . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Hale's motion for a 
mistrial where a juror overheard a bailiff shout, "guilty, 
guilty, guilty." R.247[120,129,144]. The comment merited a 
mistrial because it was a consequential remark that led to an 
improvable juror taint, as well as gave rise to the appearance of 
improper proceedings. 
The trial court likewise erred as a matter of law in denying 
Hale's motion to suppress constitutionally unreliable eyewitness 
identification evidence. R.246[41-45]. The totality of the 
circumstances establish that the identification was made in the 
midst of an extremely fearful situation which hampered the 
observer's ability to make a reliable identification. Moreover, 
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the identification was tainted by an officer's statement assuring 
the witness that he picked the right person from a photo array 
that occurred just before a live line-up in which the same 
witness identified Hale. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
HALE'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WHERE A JUROR OVERHEARD A 
BAILIFF YELL "GUILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY", AND THE ERROR 
PREJUDICED THE OUTCOME OF HALEfS TRIAL. 
Both the United States and Utah constitutions guarantee the 
right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const, amends. 
VI Sc XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, §§ 10 & 12. "The right to a trial 
by a fair and impartial jury is an important one which should be 
scrupulously safeguarded." State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 
(Utah 1977) (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 
1985), set forth the rule regarding juror contact with court 
personnel: 
[A] rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any 
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses, 
attorneys or court personnel and jurors which goes 
beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief 
contact [W] hen the contact is more than 
incidental, the burden is on the prosecution to prove 
that the unauthorized contact did not influence the 
juror. 
Id. at 280; see also State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 
1987) . 
The reasoning underlying Pike is twofold. First, it is 
impossible to prove juror taint. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. 
"[I]mproper contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may 
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not even be able to recognize." Id. 
"Another reason for the presumption is the deleterious 
effect upon the judicial process because of the appearance of 
impropriety." Id. 
An improper juror contact creates an appearance of 
collusion or impropriety in the proceedings from which 
the judicial process may suffer in the eyes of the 
public. If improper juror contact is not prevented, a 
doubt may exist in the mind of the losing party, and 
the public as a whole, as to whether the defendant was 
given a fair trial. 
State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah App. 1992) (citation 
omitted). 
Whether a statement is consequential and gives rise to an 
unrebutted presumption of prejudice is assessed on appeal in 
light of these two principles. See State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 
909-10 (Utah App. 1990) (evaluating contested statement in light 
of Pikef s two-fold rationale). 
In the present case, Hale objected to the "guilty, guilty, 
guilty" comment as prejudicial, arguing that it subconsciously 
impacted the juror and compromised his right to a trial by an 
impartial jury. R.247[133]. Hale noted that the statement was 
made by a uniformed officer inside the courthouse and, therefore, 
the juror might give the comment added significance. R.247 [134]. 
Judge Lewis below made no specific determination as to 
whether the bailiff's remark amounted to a consequential 
statement resulting in a presumption of prejudice under Pike. 
R.247 [144]. The judge, however, acknowledged that the statement 
was highly improper and expressed her extreme displeasure that it 
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was made. R.247[117,118,123,125,126,131-32] . 
Without swearing in the jurors, the judge questioned them as 
to whether they heard the statement. R.247[119]. One juror 
indicated that she heard "something to the effect of 'they are 
guilty.' I'm not sure who said it, but somebody yelled it out." 
R.247 [120]. The juror indicated that she understood it as a 
joke, that it did not interfere with her ability to be impartial, 
and assured that she did not speak about it to other jurors. 
R.247 [120-21] . The judge further ascertained that the other 
jurors, who did not hear the remark, were not impacted by it. 
R.247 [123] . The judge concluded by telling the jury that the 
remark "had nothing to do with this case, and that it should 
never have been made." R.247[123]. 
The judge then summoned Bailiffs Galloway and Twitchell. 
Without swearing them in, she questioned them about their 
conversation. R.247[129-31]. Twitchell explained that he stated 
to Galloway, "it's a good thing when they put the jury together 
that they don't instruct them on guilty, guilty, guilty, guilty." 
R.247 [130] . Galloway said that he responded out loud, "guilty, 
guilty, guilty." R.247[131]. Both bailiffs stated that their 
comments did not pertain to Hale's case in particular. 
R.247 [130-31] . Twitchell further noted that he did not recognize 
Hale's jury standing nearby, and was not aware of the charges 
against Hale. R.247[130-31] . 
Based on her questioning of the juror(s) and the bailiffs, 
the judge determined that the statement did not interfere with 
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Hale's right to a fair trial and did not impact the juror who 
heard it. R.247 [144]; see Addendum C (Transcript of Proceedings 
Regarding Motion for Mistrial). 
In the absence of a specific determination under Pike, this 
Court may address this issue on appeal where there is ample 
relevant evidence in the record. See Jonas, 793 P.2d at 908 
(trial court did not address whether statement was inconsequen-
tial, but record contained sufficient information to rebut 
prejudice presumption such that issue was addressed on appeal). 
There is ample record evidence regarding the statement at issue 
in the case such that this Court may address the issue on appeal 
notwithstanding the absence of a specific determination by the 
court under Pike. Indeed, the trial court garnered the essential 
information for a Pike analysis because it established who made 
the comment, under what circumstances, what it pertained to, who 
heard it, and its impact upon the juror(s). R.247 [116-44] ; see, 
e.g., Erickson, 749 P.2d at 620-21 (reversing trial court's 
denial of mistrial based on record evidence of testimonies from 
parties involved in improper juror-witness contact). 
In light of the evidence on the record, the statement, 
"guilty, guilty, guilty," is a consequential remark giving rise 
to an unrebutted presumption of prejudice. See Pike, 712 P.2d at 
280. The remark affected an improvable taint that is not likely 
to be appreciated or perceived by the jurors. Id. ("improper 
contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be 
able to recognize"). In addition, it lends an appearance of 
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impropriety to the proceedings. Id. 
As an initial matter, the very substance of the remark -
guilt - merits a mistrial. R.247[129]. Although the bailiffs' 
comments were not directed at Hale's case in particular, 
R.247 [130-31] , the comment, going to the crux of Hale's trial -
guilt or innocence, "touched on [an] extremely sensitive issue." 
Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah App. 1990) (mistrial required 
where bailiff's comment to jury, although not related to the 
specific case, "touched on the extremely sensitive issue of 
sentencing"). The remark is not a mere "civilit[y]" such as 
"'Hello' or 'Good morning.'" Jonas, 793 P.2d at 909. Moreover, 
the words "guilty, guilty, guilty" are not the sort of 
"unavoidable" exchange that occurs between a juror and bailiff 
who acts as a "contact" person, answering appropriate juror 
questions and serving jurors' needs. Id. (no mistrial required 
where bailiff answered juror's question as to whereabouts of 
another juror who was dismissed). 
Additionally, the remark merits a mistrial because it 
touches upon the guilt issue and, by extension, goes to the 
credibility of defense witnesses who established Hale's alibi 
defense. See Pike, 712 P.2d 281 (sanctioning remarks that 
"breed [] a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the 
jurors' judgment as to credibility"). Hale, his girlfriend Lisa 
Salazar, and his friend Christopher Arnn testified that Hale was 
at Arnn's house during the hours that he allegedly kidnaped and 
^obbed Lewis at gunpoint. R.247[239-71] ,248 [25-48] . If 
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believed, their testimonies would have exonerated Hale from the 
charges against him. With the taint of the "guilty, guilty, 
guilty" comment in the minds of the jurors, however, they were 
prone to discredit the witnesses presented in support of Hale's 
alibi defense. R.247[129]; see Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. In fact, 
Hale was convicted as charged. R.170. Accordingly, the comment 
was "sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice" such that 
the trial court erred in denying Hale's motion for a mistrial. 
Pike, 712 P.2d at 281. 
Indeed, the impact of the bailiff's statement is compounded 
given that the State's evidence against Hale is not strong. The 
only evidence purporting to tie Hale to the crime was presented 
through the testimonies of Lewis and Douglas.1 R.247[146-207, 
217-34]. As noted Point II, infra, Lewis' identification of Hale 
is incredible, if not constitutionally unreliable, given the 
fearful situation in which it was made and the likelihood of 
taint upon his second live line-up identification of Hale. 
Moreover, Douglas' testimony is incredible given her motive to 
taper her testimony to ensure that she received the State's 
promise of immunity from prosecution based on her fraudulent use 
of Lewis' credit cards. R.247[217,229-30]. Douglas' admitted 
animosity toward Hale, as well as her romantic relationship with 
The State also presented Lori Snarr as a witness to 
establish that she found an abandoned white honda in Bingham 
Canyon. R.247[213-14]. However, her testimony did not link Hale 
to the crime because she testified that she did not see any 
people around the car at the time she spotted it. R.247[215]. 
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Dongarra, further undermine the credibility of her testimony 
implicating Hale. See Immunity Grant and Agreement (State 
Exhibit No. 9 contained in unpaginated envelope included in 
appellate record); R.247[218,228]. Hence, in light of the 
weaknesses in the State's case against Hale, the comment likely 
shifted the minds of the jurors toward the guilty verdict in this 
case. See Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. 
The comment's prejudicial impact is not diminished simply 
because the juror who overheard the comment, and the remaining 
jurors who learned of the comment during the court's questioning 
of them regarding the same, assured the court that it did not 
affect their ability to sit impartially. As noted in Pike, juror 
assurances are "not enough to rebut the presumption of 
prejudice." Id. The efficacy of the jurors' assurances here is 
further called into question because they were not made under 
oath. See Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 227 (mistrial required where 
bailiff's unsworn testimony alone showed absence of improper 
influence). 
The bailiffs' related assurances likewise fail to ameliorate 
the prejudice in this case. Like the jury, the bailiffs were not 
sworn in when they explained that their statements had no 
relationship to Hale's trial. R.247[129-32]. In fact, their 
position as bailiffs, their uniforms, and their association with 
the court and the judicial system lent their comments added 
weight which would have impacted the juror(s) more than a similar 
statement from a person not so closely linked with the court or 
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Hale's case. 
In reality, the words "guilty, guilty, guilty" likely left a 
subconscious impact upon the mind of a juror(s) in Hale's case. 
See Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; R.247[129]. "Improper contacts may 
influence a juror in ways her or she may not even be able to 
recognize." Id. In turn, their ability to sit as impartial fact 
finders was compromised in violation of Hale's constitutional 
right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. See U.S. Const, 
amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, §§ 10 12; see also Pike, 
712 P.2d at 280. The resulting "inherent difficulty in proving 
how or whether a juror has in fact been influence" underscores 
the need for a mistrial in this case. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. 
In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Hale's motion for a mistrial. Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 227. The 
bailiff's "guilty, guilty, guilty" statement "touched on an 
extremely sensitive issue." Id. at 226; R.247[129]. In turn, it 
affected the jurors' ability to assess the credibility of Hale's 
alibi defense witnesses with the impartiality that is 
constitutionally required. See U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; 
Utah Const. Art. I, §§ 10 & 12; Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. The 
resulting possibility of improvable juror taint merits a mistrial 
in this case. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. Moreover, mistrial is 
required on account of the fact that the remark lends an air of 
impropriety, giving rise to a doubt in Hale's mind, and in the 
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eyes of the public, that Hale received a fair trial.2 Id. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HALE'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS LEWIS' UNRELIABLE AND TAINTED IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY. 
The trial erred in denying Hale's motion to suppress the 
unreliable and tainted identification evidence because it was 
constitutionally unreliable under the totality of the 
circumstances. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 
1991) ("ultimate question to be determined is, whether under the 
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable"); 
State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926-27 (trial court's conclusion 
that identification is constitutionally reliable is a mixed 
question of law and fact). 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
that, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." This provision requires 
that eyewitness identification evidence must be reliable under 
the totality of the circumstances. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
The trial court must preliminarily assess the reliability of 
2
 "Of course, incidental or inconsequential contacts will 
not give rise to [the Pike] rule." Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 
P.2d 224, 226 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Durand, 569 P.2d at 1109; 
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 908-09 (Utah App. 1990)). In those 
cases, the burden is on the defendant to establish that he was 
prejudiced by the remark. See Durand, 569 P.2d at 1109 
("notwithstanding a showing of minor impropriety or irregularity, 
there should be no reversal of a conviction unless it appears 
that a party has been prejudiced") (citation omitted). 
Assuming for the sake of argument only that "guilty, guilty, 
guilty" did not amount to a consequential remark, the prejudice 
to Hale would nonetheless require a mistrial in this case for the 
same reasons discussed supra Point I. 
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an eyewitness identification to determine whether such evidence 
can be presented to a jury in keeping with the defendant's rights 
under Article I, Section 7. Id. The following factors are 
pertinent to the reliability analysis: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor 
during the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention 
to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his 
or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This 
last area includes such factors as whether the event 
was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during 
the time it was observed, and whether the race of the 
actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). The 
court's findings must be made on the record. See State v. 
Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997). 
In this manner, the trial court acts as a "gatekeeper," 
preventing constitutionally unreliable eyewitness identification 
evidence from going to the jury. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778; see 
also Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944. The court's gatekeeper role is 
premised on empirical data establishing the fallibility of such 
evidence; a jury's tendency to be unaware of the inherent 
weaknesses of human recall and to give an identification undue 
weight; and the resulting potential for "erosion of 
constitutional guarantees." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-80 (citing 
Long, 721 P.2d at 488-90 (discussing weaknesses of memory)). 
Citing Ramirez, Long and Nelson, the court made the 
following findings on the record in support of the reliability of 
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the eyewitness identification: 
- Lewis was an "unusually clear, articulate witness," 
R.246[41]; he was neither too young nor too old "to have good 
judgment and a sense of perspective." R.246[42]. 
- Lewis had "more than adequate opportunity to see, to 
remember, to form an opinion, [and] to look at the person . . . 
from a number of different angles, over a lengthy period." Id. 
"He not only saw the person from a distance, he saw the person 
close up. He not only saw the person from the position of being 
in the car looking outside of the car, he also had the 
opportunity to assess height and stature by standing next to the 
individuals." R.246[43]. 
- Although the man identified as Hale wore sunglasses 
throughout the encounter, Lewis was able to see the man's eyes 
underneath the glasses. R.246[42]. Lewis was therefore able to 
note the man's pattern of blinking. Id. 
- Lewis' identification was consistent. He identified Hale 
in the photo array and the line-up. Id. 
- Lewis was able to view the man prior to having any reason 
to fear him, "first in the rear view mirror, and as the persons 
stepped nearer the car itself, long before a weapon was 
displayed." R.246[43]. 
- Once the weapon was displayed, Lewis "cautious[ly] and 
careful[ly]" observed his assailants, "showing a calm, logical, 
intelligent approach." Id. Lewis "testified in a manner 
consistent with someone who paid careful attention and was 
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focused on what was occurring." R.246[44]. "[N]othing in the 
witnesses demeanor [] suggest [s] that any fear he might have felt 
has resulted in confusion. . . . [T]he witness's speech was calm, 
precise, logical, thoughtful, and clear, in his descriptions of 
what he observed and in his recollection." R.246 [45]. 
- "There are no race issues that confuse or make difficult 
the issue of [Lewis'] identification." R.246[43]. 
- Lewis testified that the lighting was good during the 
encounter. R.246[44]. 
- Lewis provided a description . . . "not only relative to 
height and lighting, but as to the coloring of the defendant, his 
stature, his facial hair, the color of his head hair, [and] 
certain specific characteristics about his eyes." R.246 [48]. 
- "There are no problems with [Lewis'] capacity to make 
observations, no problems with his mental state. He . . . had [] 
adequate . . . sleep [and] was not under the influence of drugs 
that would have interfered with his capacity to observe, to 
remember." R.24 6[44]. 
- The identification process was not a suggestive "show-up. 
But rather the more standard and permissible process of first 
commencing with the description, followed by a photo-spread." 
Id. The photo spread was reliable because it consisted of photos 
of six similar people. Id. The line-up also consisted of "eight 
individuals with similar coloring, stature, similar race, etc." 
Id. 
- "The mere fact that officer Timmerman may have said to 
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[Lewis], after his identification, and after his description, 
that he had picked a person that they also believed might be the 
individual, . . . did not in any way taint that identification. 
It was not prior to; it was subsequent to the identification." 
R.246 [46] . 
- Both the array and the line-up were "close in time" to the 
event and, therefore, Lewis' "memory would [not] have been 
impaired." Id. 
- "There was no impermissible suggestion prior to the photo-
spread or the line-up such as, 'the person's in the spread' . . . 
or 'the person's in the line-up.' Rather, it was a general 
statement, 'we'd like you to look at this and see if you can 
identify the person or persons that were involved.'" Id.; see 
also Addendum D (Transcript of Court's Findings Regarding 
Suppression Motion). 
The trial court's determination that Lewis' identification 
was reliable is in error because the evidence, fully marshaled 
and viewed in a light most favorable to the court's decision, is 
"legally insufficient" to support its findings in support 
thereof. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, % 41, 993 P.2d 837 (appellant 
bears burden of "marshal[ling] the evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that [the] identification was reliable and then 
show that such evidence was legally insufficient to support that 
finding"). 
The following evidence was presented at the preliminary 
hearing and/or suppression hearing: 
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- On March 19, 1999, Lewis had a good night's sleep. . 
R.246[6]. He was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
Id. He took prescription drugs that morning, but they did not 
interfere with his ability to observe and perceive events. 
R.246[7]. He wore corrective glasses that day and testified that 
they improved his vision. Id. 
- It was a clear, sunny day. R.246[8]. 
- As Lewis sat in his car in Sugarhouse Park, he saw two men 
in his rear view mirror walking toward his car. R.246 [9-10] . 
Lewis saw them as they passed within several feet of his car. 
R.246 [10-11] . Lewis saw the men again as they walked back toward 
his car. Id. He was able to view the men's faces. Id. Lewis 
then saw the men looking in his window. R.246 [12] . He saw their 
faces again. Id. 
- Lewis noted when the men looked in his window that one 
wore sunglasses. Id. They did not wear hats, masks, or facial 
coverings. Id. 
- The man with the sunglasses asked Lewis where a local 
sports shop was. R.246 [12-13] . After Lewis said he did not 
know, the man revealed a gun. R.246[13]. The man said, "well, 
you're going to take us there anyway." Id. 
- The man ordered Lewis out of the car and into the back 
seat. R.246 [14] . The man sat in the backseat next to Lewis, 
about four or five inches away. R.246[15-16]. 
- The second man, Dongarra, drove the car one hour, while 
the dark-haired man remained in the back with Lewis. R.246 [16] . 
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- The dark-haired man always wore his sunglasses. 
R.246 [16] . Lewis saw the man's eyes underneath the glasses from 
the side. R.246 [17] . Lewis noticed the man had a peculiarly 
slow manner of blinking. Id. 
- The car stopped by the road in Big Cottonwood Canyon. Id. 
The dark-haired man ordered Lewis out of the car and down a 
ravine. R.246 [18] . Dongarra drove off; the man and Lewis 
remained together in the ravine for one hour. R.246[19]. There 
was ample light in the ravine. Id. Lewis viewed the man's face 
from a distance of six feet. R.246[19,30]. The man left Lewis 
in the ravine. R.245[13]. 
- Lewis identified Hale out of a photo array ten days later. 
R.246[20,23]. The array consisted of six photos of men of 
similar race, coloring, age, and stature. R.246[21-22]. After 
the array, Detective Timmerman stated, "you picked the right 
one." R.246[33]. 
- Lewis identified Hale again in a live line-up conducted in 
May, 1999 at the police station. R.246[24-25]. The line-up 
consisted of eight men of similar race, hair color, and age. Id. 
Lewis was told by an officer that the suspect may or may not be 
in the line-up. R.246[24]. He identified Hale on account of his 
slow blinking pattern. R.246[29]. 
This evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the court's findings, does not support the court's determination 
that Lewis' identification was constitutionally reliable under 
the totality of the evidence. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; 
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Decorso, 1999 UT 57, % 41, 993 P.2d 837. First, Lewis* 
"opportunity to view the actor during the event," his "degree of 
attention to the actor at the time of the event," and his 
"capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity," was severely compromised, if not entirely 
nullified, under the circumstances. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 
(first through third factors). 
Lewis' fear during these events clouded his perception, 
thereby rendering his identification unreliable. As nbted in 
Long, "when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of 
stress, perceptual abilities are known to decrease signifi-
cantly." 721 P.2d at 489. Lewis testified that this was a very 
traumatizing event for him. R.246[26]. He feared for his life 
during the entire encounter. Id. In fact, he was so traumatized 
that he initially told police that he could not provide a 
description of his assailants. Id. Indeed, Lewis had reason to 
be frightened for his life; he testified that the gun was always 
pointed at him, and he feared that it would be fired. R.246 [27] . 
Lewis' fear actually obstructed his physical ability to see 
the man he identified as Hale. Lewis testified that he was 
looking at Dongarra, not the man with the gun, as he rifled 
through his wallet while still parked in Sugarhouse Park. R.246 
[35] . Throughout the car ride, he avoided staring at his 
assailants, out of fear for his life, so as not to anger them. 
R.246 [29] . He was also focused on the gun which was constantly 
trained on him. R.246[27]. He was similarly focused on keeping 
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track of where Dongarra was driving. Id. Consequently, he never 
looked at the men beyond an occasional "glance." R.246 [29] . 
The Court in Long noted the scientific term ascribed to this 
process whereby an observer is blocked by fear from perceiving 
certain critical facts during a traumatizing event: "selective 
perception." 721 P.2d at 489. 
[T]he human brain cannot receive and store all the 
stimuli simultaneously presented to it. This forces 
people to be selective in what they perceive of any 
given vent. To accomplish this selective perception 
successfully, over time each person develops 
unconscious strategies for determining what elements of 
an event are important enough to be selected for 
perception. The rest of the stimuli created by the 
event are ignored by the brain. 
Id. Given that so much was happening to Lewis all at once, as he 
himself testified, his attention was focused on the gun and 
saving his life. R.246[26-27]. He therefore could not have 
adequately processed other details of the event, such as his 
assailants' features, to provide a reliable identification. See 
Long, 721 P.2d at 489. Indeed, as noted in Long, Lewis' process 
of "selective perception" likely left out details that were 
critical to the identification of Hale for trial purposes. 
To the extent that court proceedings may focus on 
events that were not of critical importance to the 
observer at the time they occurred, then, the observer 
may have absolutely no memory of the facts simply 
because he or she failed to select the critical 
information for perception. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Physical barriers similarly obscured Lewis' view of the 
dark-haired man. Lewis testified that the man wore dark 
sunglasses throughout the encounter. R.246[28]. He could only 
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see the man's face from the side while in the car. Id. 
Moreover, Lewis did not view the man as he walked down the ravine 
because the man followed behind, and Lewis did not look back 
because he was concentrating on keeping a foothold on the steep, 
rocky, snow-covered terrain. R.246[18,29]. 
In addition, the trial court's finding that Lewis had an 
opportunity to view the man identified as Hale prior to having a 
reason to be afraid is not supported in the evidence. Lewis 
testified that he saw the men in his rearview mirror, again as 
they passed his car, and then as they walked back toward his car. 
R.246 [9-11] . However, his attention was not focused on them at 
this point. He was reading his paper and eating his lunch, and 
only glanced up occasionally to watch them. R.246 [11] . Lewis 
also testified that it was not unusual for people to be in the 
park so he did not take particular notice of the men. Id. 
Moreover, he could not see the mens1 heads as they passed by 
because his view was cut off by the doorframe of his car. Id. 
Likewise, although both men looked into Lewis' car window 
and the dark-haired one asked where the sporting goods store was, 
that encounter in and of itself is not a reliable basis for the 
identification. R.246 [12-13] . The question period lasted no 
longer than the time it took for the question to be asked and 
answered; the man pulled the gun immediately afterwards. Id. 
That Lewis was not particularly observant in this brief time is 
evinced by the fact that he could not remember whether or not the 
man wore the sunglasses when he asked the question. R.246 [13] . 
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Hence, contrary to the trial court's finding, Lewis did not have 
adequate time or opportunity to see prior to being afraid to make 
a reliable identification of Hale. R.246[42]. 
Lewis' identification is similarly unreliable under the 
fourth Ramirez factor, "whether the witness' identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether 
it was the product of suggestion." 817 P.2d at 781. In the 
first instance, Lewis' identification was not spontaneous. In 
fact, he had to be coaxed into reporting the incident to police, 
let alone giving a description of the assailants, by the motorist 
that picked him up in the canyon. R.245[50]. His hesitancy 
continued even when he spoke with police as he explained to the 
officers that he was so traumatized he might not be able to offer 
a description. R.246[26]. 
Lewis' identification of Hale lacked spontaneity for the 
added reason that his photo array and line-up identifications did 
not occur until ten days (March, 29, 1999) and six weeks (May 4, 
1999), respectively, after the event occurred. See Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 783 (length of time between event and identification is 
relevant to reliability analysis); R.246[20,24]. Such a lapse in 
time affects the ability to adequately recall details. As noted 
in Long, "[r]esearch demonstrates that both the length of time 
between the witness's experience and the recollection of that 
experience, and the occurrence of other events in the intervening 
time period, affect the accuracy and completeness of recall." 
721 P.2d at 489. 
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Lewis' identification also lacks consistency. Once he 
finally gave a description to the police one hour after the 
incident, he omitted the fact that the dark-haired man had a 
goatee, R.245 [29]; Lewis, testified with certainty at his 
preliminary hearing, however, that the man did have a goatee. 
R.245[20]. Lewis' inconsistency continued into the line-up 
identification where he initially thought that the man was not 
present. R.246 [28] . He identified Hale only after tentatively 
concluding that Hale's blinking resembled that of his assailant. 
R.246 [ [28-29] . 
At minimum, Lewis' line-up identification is unreliable in 
light of the foregoing, and for the added reason that it is the 
product of impermissible suggestion. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
781. After Lewis identified Hale in the photo array on March 19, 
1999, Officer Timmerman said he had the right person. R.246 [33] . 
Several weeks later, Lewis attended a live line-up in which he 
identified Hale again. R.246[25]. Lewis was not certain about 
the line-up identification, thinking the suspect was not 
included. R.246[28]. However, as noted above, he eventually 
identified Hale after concluding that his blinking resembled that 
of the dark-haired man. R.246[29]. 
In State v. Perry, this Court sanctioned a similar statement 
from a police officer to an observer, holding that the subsequent 
show-up in that case was suggestive. 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah 
App. 1995) . The officer in that case told the witness, prior to 
her identification, that the "police had apprehended the 
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registered owner of the car that she had seen that night and that 
he matched her description of the assailant." Id. Timmerman's 
statement likewise tainted Lewis' subsequent line-up 
identification because it influenced his ability to independently 
recall the event. Id. Moreover, as a law enforcement officer, 
Timmerman's statement carried added weight, and therefore an 
added "potential for distortion" because Lewis looked to the 
police to help him identity and apprehend his assailants. Long, 
721 P.2d at 490 (noting that "subtle and perhaps unconscious" 
responses to an observer's recall of events "can significantly 
influence what a witness 'remembers'"). 
As a final matter, the trial court erred in denying Hale's 
motion to suppress the identification evidence given the 
extremely fearful "nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that [Lewis would not] perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. As discussed supra, 
Lewis testified that this was a traumatizing event in which he 
feared for his life. R.246[26]. As noted in Long, the human 
brain is not capable of receiving so many stimuli all at once, so 
it "selective[ly] perceives" only the elements that are most 
important to the observer. 721 P.2d at 489. In this case, Lewis 
was most concerned with his life and so was concentrated on the 
one thing that could end it immediately - the gun that was 
constantly pointed at him. R.246[26-27]. Lewis, therefore, was 
not paying sufficiently careful attention to his assailants to 
provide a reliable identification; his brain effectively 
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"ignore[d]" that aspect of the incident. See Long, 721 P.2d at 
489. Indeed, as he testified, he was avoiding staring at the men 
so as not to anger them. R.246[29]. 
In sum, the trial court erred in concluding that Lewis1 
identification of Hale was constitutionally reliable. See Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. In fact, the 
court's findings supporting its reliability determination are not 
supported by the totality of the circumstances. See Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 781; Decorso, 1999 UT 57, % 41, 993 P.2d 837. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Hale respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse the lower court's denial of his suppression 
motion and his motion for a new trial, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this HiJL day of May, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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US NOW, TOLD 
THE AREA 
COURT: OH, NO. 
REMAL: WHEN I WENT BACK TO THE OFFICE 
, MY COLLEAGUE KIM, CLARK, WHO IS WITH 
ME THAT THIS MORNING WHILE SHE WAS IN 
OF THE ELEVATORS DOWNSTAIRS SHE OVERHEARD 




COURT: WHAT IS IT? 
REMAL: APPARENTLY WHILE THE PANEL WAS 
THERE WAITING FOR THE ELEVATOR, THERE WAS A 
BRIEF CONVERSATION WHERE THEY WERE HELD, AND THEY 
WERE HELD TO GO TO JUDGE LEWIS'S COURTROOM. FROM 
SOMEWHERE BEHIND MS. CLARK, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN 
THE AREA OF THE METAL DETECTORS, SHE HEARD A VOICE 




COURT: WHO SAID THAT? 
CLARK: I CAN'T TELL YOU, YOUR HONOR. 


























WERE BEHIND ME. THERE WAS THREE OF THEM THERE THIS 
MORNING. I JUST DIDN'T TURN AND LOOK. I DIDN'T 
WANT TO MAKE A BIG DEAL ABOUT IT AND MAKE IT WORSE 
THAN IT COULD HAVE BEEN. 
THE COURT: I WOULD LIKE TO KILL THEM. 
MS. CLARK: I WOULD THINK THEY WOULD KNOW 
BETTER. 
THE COURT: BUT WE DON'T KNOW WHO THEY 
WERE? 
MS. CLARK: I CAN REMEMBER TWO OF THE 
THREE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, ALL I CAN DO 
ASK IN A VERY CAREFUL WAY WHETHER THEY HEARD 
ANYTHING FROM THE BAILIFFS AT THE DOOR, JOKING 
GUILT OR INNOCENCE, OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE. 
MY GUESS IS THEY DIDN'T HEAR ANYTHING, 
MY HOPE IS, LET ME TELL YOU, THAT WON'T HAPPEN 
AGAIN. I'M APPALLED. 
MS. CLARK: I WAS SPEAKING TO OFFICER 
ROWLEY, THINKING I'M GOING TO TAKE THE STAIRS 
BECAUSE IT WAS A BIG PANEL. 
THE COURT: THIS IS GOING TO A A REAL 
BROUHAHA. THIS APPALLS ME. IF YOU HAVE LOW I. 
PEOPLE, IT'S ONE OF THE THINGS THAT CAN OCCUR. 































WERE THERE ANY WOMEN BAILIFF'S THERE? IT 






THREE GUYS. THERE WEREN'T ANY 
IF THIS PANEL INDICATES IN ANY 
WAY THEY HEARD, WE'LL DEAL WITH IT. BUT THEY WILL 






YOU SAID. I 
OF IT. 
THANK 
DON'T THEY HAVE ANY JUDGMENT? 
CLARK: 
COURT: 
I DON'T KNOW IF OFFICER ROWLEY 
WE HAVE MADE A RECORD OF WHAT 
WILL ASK HIM. BUT THIS WILL TAKE CARE 
WE'LL GET ON 




ON THE RECORE 
GIVEN 
WANTS 




). I AM 
THE CALIBER OF 
LET' S GO IN 
IT THE RECORD RIGHT AWAY. 
DO YOU WANT ME TO STAY? 
I DON'T THINK SO, UNLESS 
YOU'VE MADE CLEAR WHAT HAPPENED 
JUST SORRY IT HAPPENED. BUT 
PEOPLE WE HIRE AT THE DOORS--
AND SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. NO ONE 
A MISTRIAL, I AM ASSUMING, IF WE CAN AVOID IT. 
MS. REMAL: 
M CONCERNED IF 
THE COURT: 
NO, NOT IF WE CAN AVOID IT. 
ANYONE OVERHEARD IT. 
WE'LL GO SEE. 


























COUNSEL PRESENT, DEFENDANT PRESENT.) 
THE'COURT: YOU ARE WELCOME TO BE SEATED 
AGAIN. THANK YOU. FOR THE RECORD, I HAVE PUT THE 
QUESTION JUST NOW TO OFFICER ROWLEY, WHO HEARD 
NOTHING, BUT INDICATED HE WAS AT THE BACK OF THE 
JURY, SORT OF SHEPHERDING THEM FORWARD. SO THAT'S 
AN INDICATION THIS WAS NOT HEARD BY EVERYONE. 
NOTHING MORE THAN THAT. 
(JURY BROUGHT INTO COURTROOM AND 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE.) 
THE COURT: TAKE YOUR ORIGINAL SEATS, IF 
YOU WOULD, UNLESS YOU'VE ALL DECIDED TO SWITCH 
PLACES. 
ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, LADIES AND 
GENTLEMEN. GOOD TO SEE YOU BACK. I HOPE YOU HAD A 
GOOD LUNCH. LET ME JUST ASK YOU: DID ANY OF YOU 
DISCUSS THE CASE OR FORM ANY OPINIONS OVER THE NOON 
HOUR, OR ALLOW ANYONE ELSE TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU? 
IF ANYONE DID, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HANDS. NO 
RAN ARE RAISED. ONE ADDITIONAL QUESTION: IT'S COME 
TO MY ATTENTION THAT ONE OR TWO OF THE BAILIFFS THAT 
DO THE MONITORING AT THE DOORS ON THE MAIN FLOOR BY 
THE METAL DETECTORS MAY HAVE MADE SOME JOKING 
REFERENCE TO CASES IN GENERAL AS YOU ALL WERE 
WALKING BY TO GET TO THE ELEVATORS. 
DID ANYONE HEAR ANY REFERENCE TO THIS CASE, 




OFFICERS AT THE METAL DETECTOR THIS MORNING? 
DID ANYONE HEARING ANYTHING? IF SO, RAISE 
HANDS. OUR THIRD PROSPECTIVE JUROR HAS RAISED 
HAND. AND THAT'S MS. MURRAY. MS. MURRAY, WHAT 
DO YOU RECALL HEARING. 
ARE 
JUROR: SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF-- "THEY 
GUILTY." I'M NOT SURE WHO SAID IT, BUT SOMEBODY 
YELLED IT OUT. 
JUST 
THE COURT: DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS 
A JOKING COMMENT. 
JUROR: YES. 
THE COURT: YOU DID NOT UNDERSTAND IT TO BE 







THE COURT: FROM YOUR EXPRESSION, 
MURRAY, I'M ASSUMING THAT YOU FELT IT WAS KIND 
SILLY REMARK AND DID NOT PERTAIN TO THIS CASE; 




THE COURT: HAS THAT IN ANY WAY INTERFERRED 
YOUR ABILITY TO BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN THIS 
. 
1 JUROR: NO. 
2 THE COURT: AND YOU DID NOT UNDERSTAND IT 
3 TO REFER TO THIS CASE IN PARTICULAR; IS THAT 
4 CORRECT? 
5 JUROR: THAT'S CORRECT. 
6 THE COURT: ALL OF YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND 
7 THAT THE BAILIFFS AND THE OFFICERS WHO WERE AT THE 
8 MENTAL DETECTORS HAD HAVE NO IDEA WHICH CASES ARE 
9 BEING TRIED IN WHICH COURT. 
10 AND EVEN IF THEY DID KNOW WHICH CASES ARE 
11 BEING TRIED IN WHICH COURTS, THEY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT 
12 ANY OF THE CASES. IT WOULD BE TO SAY THERE ARE 
13 ABOUT FOURTEEN JUDGES ON THIS FLOOR, AND THAT SOME 
14 OF THE CASES ARE CRIMINAL, SOME OF THEM ARE CIVIL. 
15 THEY ALL INVOLVE DIFFERENT FACTS. 
16 AND THERE CERTAINLY IS NEVER ANY 
17 CONVERSATION BY THIS COURT OR MY STAFF WITH ANY OF 
18 THOSE PEOPLE, NOR DO THEY SHARE COPIES OF THE 
19 PLEADINGS OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE. 
2 0 COUNSEL, YOU CERTAINLY HAD NO CONVERSATION 
21 WITH ANYONE AT THE PORTALS, ABOUT THIS CASE OR ANY 
22 OTHER? 
23 MR. PARKER: THE STATE DID NOT, YOUR HONOR. 
24 MS. REMAL: I DID NOT. 

































NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. REMAL? 
ONLY, YOUR HONOR, WHETHER OR 





BY ANOTHER BAILIFF OR ANY OTHER 
ALL RIGHT. MS. MURRAY, DID YOU 
ANY OTHER COMMENT IN RESPONSE TO THAT, OR IN 









AND YOU DIDN'T DISCUSS THIS 
ANY OF YOUR FELLOW JURORS, OBVIOUSLY. JUST 
OF THOUGHT WAS 
IT WAS NOT TAKEN 





EACH AND EVERY 
THAT OCCURS IN 
A SILLY COMMENT THAT YOU HEARD, 
SERIOUSLY BY YOU IS WHAT I 
SAYING; IS THAT CORRECT? 
• 1 
ALL RIGHT. AND AGAIN, LET ME 
ONE OF YOU THAT YOU KNOW THE 
THIS BUILDING, WHETHER IT'S A 
CIVIL CASE OR CRIMINAL CASE, OR DOMESTIC CASE, IT'S 
IMPORTANT WORK, AND I THINK THAT SOMETIMES SOME 
1 PEOPLE DON'T GIVE IT THE SERIOUSNESS IT DESERVES 
2 BECAUSE THEY TRY TO LIGHTEN THE MOOD. THE REFERENCE 
3 MS. MURRAY HEARD WAS NOT IN CONNECTION WITH THIS 
4 CASE IN PARTICULAR, AND IT SOUNDS LIKE IT WAS AN 
5 ABSOLUTELY STUPID, INSENSITIVE REMARK, CERTAINLY 
6 SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN MADE. 
7 BUT I THINK IT'S SAFE TO SAY THAT IT HAD 
8 NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE, AND THAT IT SHOULD 
9 NEVER HAVE BEEN MADE IN ANY EVENT. 
10 BUT I WANT TO BE SURE THAT ALL OF YOU 
11 UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU FEEL ITS IMPACTS, YOU, 
12 MS. MURRAY, OR ANY OF YOU IN HEARING ABOUT IT, I 
13 WANT TO KNOW NOW. DO ANY OF YOU FEEL LIKE IT'S HAD 
14 ANY EFFECT ON YOU? 
15 (NO VERBAL RESPONSE.) 
16 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND THEY'RE SHAKING 
17 THEIR HEADS IN THE NEGATIVE. 
18 IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER, MS. REMAL, THAT 
19 YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO ASK ABOUT THAT. 
2 0 MS. REMAL: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
21 THE COURT:. ALL RIGHT. AND I WILL MAKE 
2 2 SURE THAT THE PEOPLE AT THE PORTALS UNDERSTAND THAT 
2 3 THEY NEED TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT ANY LEVITY OR 
24 ATTEMPTS AT LEVITY, AND THAT IS NOT HUMOROUS IN A 
2 5 GENERIC FORM AT ALL. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT APPARENTLY 
1 IN RELATION TO THIS CASE, ABOUT WHICH NO 
OF HAD 
ONE COULD 
HAD ANY INFORMATION. IT'S INAPPROPRIATE. 
MS. REMAL: MAY WE APPROACH THE 
THE COURT: YES, CERTAINLY. 
(BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE RECORD 
THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN 




AND I'M GOING TO ASK THE BAILIFF 
THE JURY ROOM, AND ASK YOU NOT TO 
EVEN WITH ONE ANOTHER. I THINK IT 
BENCH? 
. ) • 










BACK AFTER THAT. 
BAILIFF: SURE. 
(JURY EXITS COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: I'M GOING TO ASK EVERYONE 
MR. BELTRAN TO LEAVE THE COURTROOM 
THAN COUNSEL AND THE DEFENDANT. IF 
, PLEASE, 
YOU WOULD 
STEP OUT. YOU DON'T HAVE TO, DETECTIVE 
TIMMERMAN. OKAY. 
(COURTROOM CLEARED AS ORDERED.) 
YOU DON'T HAPPEN TO KNOW, STEVE, 
DOWNSTAIRS AT THE DOORS THIS MORNING? 
NO. 
BAILIFF: THE OFFICERS THAT ARE 




LEWIS. HOW ARE YOU DOING? GOOD. I NEED TO KNOW 
WHO WAS AT THE DOOR, AND I GUESS WHAT WE'RE TALKING 
ABOUT IS THE DOORS ON THE MAIN FLOOR AT THE EAST 
ENTRANCE AS YOU COME IN FROM THE DOMED AREA, THAT 
AREA, THIS MORNING. 
AND I NEED TO HAVE THEM COME UP TO MY 
COURTROOM NOW. THERE IS A REAL ISSUE WITH THIS 
JURY. ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS IS ASKING FOR A MISTRIAL 
BECAUSE APPARENTLY AT LEAST ONE OF THE BAILIFFS AT 
THE DOORS MADE SOME COMMENT ABOUT "GUILTY, GUILTY, 
GUILTY" AS MY JURORS WERE PASSING BY THIS MORNING. 
I WANT THE THREE OFFICERS UP HERE NOW 
NEED TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL. 
THIS WAS THIS MORNING AS THE 
, TO SEE IF WE 
JURORS WERE 
" BEING BROUGHT UP TO MY COURTROOM ON THE ELEVATORS, 
AND 
ANY 
THERE WERE THREE MALE 
I DON'T KNOW WHO 




SO IF THERE'S 
UP. 
NEED TO HAVE THAT DONE RIGHT NOW. OKAY? 
GOT 
I WANT THEM RIGHT IN MY COURTROOM 
A A JURY WAITING, AND 
ISSUE. THANKS. BYE. 
YOU 
(COURT CONCLUDES 
THE COURT: THIS 
SHOULD UNDERSTAND, MR. 






OF COURSE UPSETS 
HALE, THAT YOUR 
ME, BUT 
ATTORNEY 
1 HAS RAISED AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR US TO DEAL WITH. 
2 I DON'T WANT FOR YOU TO BE PREJUDICED IN 
3 ANY WAY. NOW, FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, AND THIS IS NOT 
4 THE LAST WORD ON THE SUBJECT, BECAUSE I WANT TO HEAR 
5 FROM THESE THREE OFFICERS. I AM APPALLED THAT THEY 
6 WOULD HAVE MADE SUCH A COMMENT, ANY OF THEM, OR ALL 
7 OF THEM. BUT I HAVE TALKED TO OFFICER HALL, WHO IS 
8 THE BAILIFF TODAY, AND HE WAS DOWN THERE BASICALLY 
9 BRINGING UP THE JURORS. HE HEARD NOTHING. 
10 IS THAT A FAIR COMMENT, OFFICER HALL? 
11 BAILIFF: THAT'S RIGHT. 
12 THE COURT: HE WAS AT THE BACK, AS I 
13 UNDERSTAND IT, SO IT WAS AS HE WAS SHEPHERDING THE 
14 JURORS UP. OBVIOUSLY, ONLY ONE OF THEM HEARD 
15 ANYTHING. AND THAT JUROR, TO MY MIND, DID NOT TAKE 
16 IT SERIOUSLY, DID NOT EQUATE IT WITH THIS CASE AT 
17 ALL. 
18 BUT I DO WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE AN 
19 ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS SAID, SO THAT WE 
20 CAN PUT IT INTO PERSPECTIVE. 
21 BUT IT'S IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO UNDERSTAND, 
2 2 MR. HALE, THAT YOUR ATTORNEY HAS MADE A MOTION THAT 
23 SHE FEELS IS APPROPRIATE, AND I THINK IT'S AN 
24 APPROPRIATE MOTION TO BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT. 


























WANTS TO SEE WHAT THESE OFFICERS HAVE TO SAY FOR 
THEMSELVES. WE'LL BRING THEM UP AND TRY TO GLEAN A 
BIT MORE INFORMATION. BUT IF I WERE TO GRANT THE 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL, MR. HALE, YOU'D GO BACK TO 
JAIL, AND THIS WOULD DELAY YOUR TRIAL. I DON'T KNOW 
HOW LONG IT WOULD DELAY THE TRIAL. 
LET'S LOOK, 
DO IT. WE CAN'T DO 
THE TRIAL IN ONE DAY 
DAYS. LET ME THINK 
MICHELLE, AND SEE WHEN WE COULD 
IT THIS WEEK BECAUSE WE CAN'T DO 
, AND ALL WE SET ASIDE WERE TWO 
A MINUTE. WHAT WERE WE DOING 
WEDNESDAY OF THIS WEEK? 
THE CLERK: WE HAVE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
HEARING ON IN-CUSTODY MATTER. MINOR'S SETTLEMENT, 









NEXT WEEK, I WILL BE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
SO WE'VE MATTERS ALL DAY THEN. 
YES. 
WHAT HAVE WE GOT NEXT MONDAY. 
AN IN-CUSTODY CRIMINAL CASE. 
ALL RIGHT. 
YOUR HONOR, BEFORE WE DISCUSS 
ON VACATION. MY NIECE IS 
FLYING IN THURSDAY NIGHT, AND WE'LL BE GONE NEXT 
WEEK. 
1 THE COURT: SO THAT IS NOT VIABLE. I AM 
2 NEVER GOING TO DENY AN ATTORNEY VACATION, 
3 PARTICULARLY ONE WHO DOES CRIMINAL WORK, WHO I'M 
4 EXPERIENCED ENOUGH TO KNOW BURNS THE CANDLE AT BOTH 
5 ENDS AND WORKS VERY VERY HARD. I'VE NEVER DENIED 
6 ANY LAWYER A VACATION; CERTAINLY NOT A CRIMINAL 
7 LAWYER. 
8 THE CLERK: SEPTEMBER 7 OR SEPTEMBER 27 
9 BOTH OF THOSE OR NOT IN-CUSTODY. 
10 THE COURT: SEPTEMBER 7 IS AVAILABLE, WHICH 
11 IS A COUPLE WEEKS AWAY, TO STATE THE OBVIOUS. 
12 SO IF WE CONTINUE IT, THAT'S WHAT WE'RE 
13 LOOKING AT DOING NOW. I'M GOING TO WAIT, MR. HALE, 
14 TO ASK HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS UNTIL WE'VE HEARD 
15 FROM THE OFFICERS IN QUESTION. THEY WILL BE PAYING 
i6 THE COSTS OF THE JURY ALSO, IF WE NEED TO DO A 
17 MISTRIAL. 
18 AND THERE WILL BE REPERCUSSIONS IN TERMS OF 
19 HOW THEY ARE TREATED. AND THAT'S NOTHING TO DO WITH 
2 0 THIS CASE, BUT I WANT TO GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO THINK 
21 ABOUT IT. WITH THAT IN MIND, EVERY DAY IN JAIL IS, 
22 I AM SURE, A PERIOD OF TIME THAT FEELS A LOT LONGER 
2 3 THAN 2 4 HOURS. AND I WANT YOU TO HAVE A CHANCE TO 
24 VISIT WITH MS. REMAL ABOUT HER PERSPECTIVE ON IT, 
2 5 BECAUSE SHE'S VERY EXPERIENCED AND WISE ATTORNEY. 
1 AND, FRANKLY, IF SHE'S MAKING A MOTION FOR A 
2 MISTRIAL, I MAY WELL GRANT IT. 
3 (OFFICERS ENTER COURTROOM.) 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S SEE, WE HAVE TWO 
5 OFFICERS PRESENT. CAN I GET YOU GENTLEMEN TO STATE 
6 YOUR NAMES FOR THE RECORD. 
7 OFFICER: NEIL TWITCHELL. 
8 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
9 OFFICER: MANUEL GALLOWAY. 
10 THE COURT: MR. TWITCHELL AND MR. GALLOWAY, 
11 WERE YOU AT THE DOORS THIS MORNING WHEN MY JURY 
12 PASSED BY? 
13 OFFICER GALLOWAY: YES. 
14 OFFICER TWITCHELL: YES. 
15 THE COURT: DID EITHER OF YOU SAY ANYTHING 
16 IN A JOKING MANNER OR A SERIOUS MANNER THAT COULD 
17 HAVE BEEN OVERHEARD BY MY JURY OR SOMEONE IN MY JURY 
18 ABOUT "GUILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY"? 
19 OFFICER GALLOWAY: JOKING MANNER. 
2 0 CONVERSATION BETWEEN ME AND HIM. 
21 THE COURT: WHO SAID IT? 
22 OFFICER TWITCHELL: I DID. 
23 THE COURT: OFFICER TWITCHELL, WHAT EXACTLY 
24 DID YOU DO? 











 MYOU KNOW, IT'S A 
TOGETHER THAT THEY 
GOOD THING WHEN THEY PUT 
DON'T INSTRUCT THEM ON 
3UILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY." 
THE COURT: WHAT DID YOU MEAN? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 






T EVEN UNDERSTAND WHAT 
THE JURY WAS WALKING 
"IT'S A GOOD THING WHEN THEY START 












T START THEM OUT BY 
, GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY, SO 
GALLOWAY: 
TWITCHELL: 









IT'S GOOD THING THEY 
- OTHERWISE-- IS WHAT WE 
ME, WHY DO WE HAVE SO 
THEM UP TO START WITH. 





WAS GOING BY. 
THE COURT: SO YOU 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
FOR OR WHAT IT WAS 
• 
NO. 
NO. I DIDN'T KNOW WHO 
WEREN'T REFERRING TO--
I HAD NO IDEA WHO THE 
PERTAINING-- WHO THE 
1 THE COURT: THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES? 
2 OFFICER TWITCHELL: NO. 
3 THE COURT: IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF-- SAY 
4 IT AGAIN. REPEAT IT AGAIN, IF YOU WOULD. 
5 OFFICER TWITCHELL: I SAID, "IT'S A GOOD 
6 THING THEY DON'T START THE JURY OUT WHEN THEY ARE 
7 DOWN IN THE ROOM BY SAYING, 'REMEMBER, GUILTY, 
8 GUILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY.'" 
9 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND OFFICER 
10 GALLOWAY, IS THAT THE WAY YOU REMEMBER IT? 
11 OFFICER GALLOWAY: IT IS, MA'AM. 
12 THE COURT: DID YOU MAKE ANY RESPONSE? 
13 OFFICER GALLOWAY: I JUST SAID -- I WAS 
14 LAUGHING. I WENT, "GUILTY, GUILTY, TO HIM." THAT'S 
15 IT. 
16 THE COURT: YOU SAID, "GUILTY, GUILTY" 
17 BACK. 
18 OFFICER GALLOWAY: YES. HE SAID, "GUILTY, 
19 GUILTY, GUILTY." I GOES, "GIILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY," 
2 0 NOT LOOKING AT THE JURORS OR NOTHING. 
21 THE COURT: DO YOU UNDERSTAND, FIRST OF 
22 ALL, THE RAMIFICATIONS THAT THIS HAS? DO YOU 
2 3 UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF MY JURORS HEARD THIS? 
24 OFFICER TWITCHELL: NO, I DID NOT. 
2 5 THE COURT: I AM TELLING YOU NOW. DO YOU 
1 UNDERSTAND THAT A LAWYER OVERHEARD IT AND CALLED IT 
2 TO OUR ATTENTION? DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE 
3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS? 
4 OFFICER TWITCHELL: I CAN SEE WHERE THAT 
5 WOULD BE A PROBLEM. 
6 THE COURT: IT'S A HUGE PROBLEM. AND YOU 
7 BOTH STRIKE ME AS INTELLIGENT OFFICERS WHO ARE VERY 
8 CONCERNED ABOUT DOING A GOOD JOB. I HAVE SEEN 
9 ENOUGH OF BOTH OF YOU TO KNOW YOU ARE EXTREMELY 
10 CONSCIENTIOUS IN DOING YOUR DUTY, AND YOU ARE VERY 
11 GENTEEL AND CIVIL WITH THE PUBLIC, AND WITH 
12 ATTORNEYS, AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE THE BUILDING. BUT 
13 THIS IS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER. 
14 MS. REMAL, IT SEEMS TO BE CLEAR NOW THAT 
THIS WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERAL COMMENT ABOUT HOW 
16 IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT JURORS NOT BE TOLD ANYTHING 
17 ABOUT NOT GUILTY OR GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY, BUT 
18 APPARENTLY THOSE WORDS WERE USED. APPARENTLY THE 
19 ONE JUROR WHO HEARD IT HEARD THE WORD GUILTY. I 
2 0 DON'T-- THE JUROR WAS CLEAR THAT SHE DID NOT FORM 
21 AN OPINION AS A RESULT OF THAT, NOR DID SHE 
22 CORRELATE THOSE REMARKS OR THOSE WORDS-- I SHOULD 
23 SAY, WITH THIS CASE, OR TAKE THEM TO HEART. 
24 ALL RIGHT. DO YOU HAVE A MOTION? 
2 5 MS. REMAL: MAY I CONFER WITH MR. HALE FOR 
JUST A MOMENT HERE. 
THE COURT: YES. YOU CERTAINLY MAY. 
(COUNSEL CONFERS WITH DEFENDANT OFF THE 
RECORD.) 
THE COURT: DETECTIVE BELTRAN, IF YOU WOULD 
DO THE SAME THING WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL. 
MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I DO HAVE A MOTION. 
THE COURT: THE MOTION IS? 
MS. REMAL: IT IS MY MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL, 
YOUR HONOR, BASED ON THE OFFICERS' UNDERSTANDING. 
IT DOESN'T APPEAR AS THOUGH THEY WERE INTENTIONALLY 
OR MALICIOUSLY TRYING TO CAUSE A PROBLEM. 
UNFORTUNATELY, USING THE WORDS "GUILTY, GUILTY, 
GUILTY", THOSE ARE THE WORDS THAT THE JUROR 
OVERHEARD. ALTHOUGH SHE INDICATED THAT SHE DIDN'T 
TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. 
MY CONCERN WITH JURORS, ALWAYS, AND I KNOW 
THE APPELLATE COURTS HAVE TALKED ABOUT THIS JUST IN 
TERMS OF VOIR DIRE, IS THAT WE KNOW THAT PEOPLE TRY 
VERY HARD TO FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS, WE KNOW THEY TRY 
VERY HARD TO BE GOOD JURORS, BUT THAT THERE'S 
SOMETIMES INFLUENCES THAT HAVE AN UNCONSCIOUS OR 
SUBCONSCIOUS INFLUENCE ON PEOPLE, EVEN THOUGH THEY 
MAY TRY TO SET THINGS ASIDE. 
THIS IS A CASE WHERE THERE'S AN 
1 IDENTIFICATION ISSUE, AND MY CONCERN IS THAT IF IT 
2 COMES TO A CLOSE DECISION BY JURORS, THAT THEY MAY 
3 BE INFLUENCED BY THAT. PARTICULARLY THE JUROR WHO 
4 OVERHEARD. MY SPECIAL CONCERN IS THAT THIS IS NOT A 
5 COMMENT MADE BY SOME LAY PERSON, CITIZEN, THEY HAVE 
6 NO IDEA WHO THEY ARE, BUT BY UNIFORMED OFFICERS WHO 
7 HAVE AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY HERE IN THIS BUILDING. 
8 NOT AT PART OF OUR STAFF, BUT IN THE BUILDING. 
9 AND MY CONCERN IS THAT THEY MAY THINK THE 
10 OFFICERS MUST KNOW SOMETHING, THEY WORK IN THIS 
11 BUILDING EVERY DAY, THEY SEE WHAT HAPPENS. AND FOR 
12 THOSE REASONS, I MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL. 
13 THE COURT: MR. PARKER, DO YOU WANT TO 
14 RESPOND-? 
15 MR. PARKER: WELL, I DO, YOUR HONOR. I 
16 ACKNOWLEDGE, FIRST OF ALL THE LAW IS AS MS. REMAL 
17 INDICATES. AND THAT IS, THAT THERE IS SOME FEELING, 
18 I BELIEVE, IN THE COURTS THAT IF THERE IS THE 
19 APPEARANCE OF EVIL, THAT THINGS ARE STRUCK. 
20 THE COURT: FIRST OF ALL, I'M NOT SURE YOU 
21 CAN DEEM WHAT HAPPENED AS THE APPEARANCE OF EVIL, 
2 2 BUT I GUESS I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE SAYING. 
2 3 MS. REMAL HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT SHE DOES 
2 4 NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THE COMMENT OR COMMENTS WERE 
2 5 MADE IN ANY KIND OF MALICIOUS MANNER. FURTHER, ONLY 
1 ONE JUROR HEARD IT. THE JUROR WHO HEARD IT WAS VERY 
2 CLEAR, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, AND WE CAN CERTAINLY 
3 QUESTION FURTHER, THAT THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE 
4 REMARK TO HAVE ANY BEARING ON THIS CASE. THAT IT 
5 HAD NOT IMPACTED HER FEELINGS ABOUT THE CASE AT ALL, 
6 THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD --AT LEAST IT'S MY PERCEPTION 
7 OF WHAT SHE'S SAID, AND WE CAN CLARIFY THIS, TO BE 
8 SORT OF A LIGHTHEARTED COMMENT THAT WAS NOT RELATED 
9 TO THIS CASE. 
10 I INTERRUPTED YOU. GO ON. 
11 MR. PARKER: I APPRECIATE THE COURT'S 
12 ARGUMENT. BUT THAT'S WHERE I WAS GOING. I WANTED 
13 TO INDICATE THAT I DIDN'T FEEL THAT WAS A 
14 CIRCUMSTANCE THAT AMOUNTED TO THAT. 
15 IN FACT, IN A BROAD WAY I AM WORRIED THAT 
16 THE PREJUDICE, IF ANY, THAT COMES OUT OF THIS 
17 ACTUALLY REFERS TO THE STATE. AND THE MANNER THAT 
18 IT WAS TAKEN BY THIS JUROR, I THINK THAT, IF 
19 ANYTHING, THAT SHE COULD WORRY ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY 
20 OF OFFICERS IN GENERAL. NOT SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE 
21 DEFENDANT. 
22 I GUESS MY RESPONSE IS, THAT, ONE, AS THE 
23 COURT BROUGHT OUT, IT WASN'T DIRECTED AT ALL ABOUT 
2 4 THIS DEFENDANT. THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF IT. IT 
2 5 WASN'T AN INTENTIONAL COMMENT, IT WASN'T 
INTENTIONALLY MEANT, IT WAS JUST AN ACCIDENT• 
MS. REMAL: IT WAS• 
THE COURT: IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO IN ANY 
WAY INTERFERE WITH JUSTICE, CLEARLY. THE OFFICERS 
ARE PROFESSIONALS WHO HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING ANY 
HARM, BUT IT WAS MADE INTENTIONALLY. THAT IS TO 
SAY, CERTAINLY THE WORDS CAME OUT OF THE THEIR 
MOUTHS ON PURPOSE. 
MR. PARKER: CERTAINLY. AND I'M NOT 
INDICATING THAT IT WAS OTHER THAN THAT. BUT IT WAS 
NOT LIKE THE OFFICERS HAD TRIED TO TALK TO THE 
PANEL. IT WAS NOT LIKE THE OFFICERS HAD TRIED TO DO 
SOMETHING SO DELIBERATELY SO THE PANEL COULD HEAR 
AND INFLUENCED. IT WAS ACCIDENTAL, OR INCIDENTAL. 
IT WAS SURELY 
INAPPROPRIATE, BUT IN 
IN THE CONTEXT OF NOT 
OUR FACTS, AND THAT OF 
ONLY ONE THAT HEARD IT 
A STUPID COMMENT AND 
THE CONTEXT OF WHO 




THE JURORS THEMSELVES 
TOOK IT VERY LIGHTLY, 
THAT IT WOULD NOT INFLUENCE HER, TOOK IT 
1 AN INAPPROPRIATE JOKE. 
I JUST DON'T ' 
PREJUDICE IN THIS CASE 
INFLUENCE HER DECISION 
HOW CLOSE THE CASE IS. 
rHINK THAT EQUATES 







OR HER ABILITY, REGARDLESS OF 
1 THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE THE COURT'S 
2 REMARKS DID BY WAY OF HAVING AN IMPACT ON THIS? DO 
3 YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY HARM MAY HAVE BEEN AMELIORATED 
4 OR EXACERBATED? 
5 MR. PARKER: I THINK THE COURT HANDLED IT 
6 APPROPRIATELY IN THE BROAD WAY IT WAS ADDRESSED. 
7 AND THAT THE COURT'S INDICATION THAT THE 
8 COMMENT WAS SURELY A STUPID COMMENT THAT SHOULD NOT 
9 HAVE BEEN MADE. WE CAN SURELY MAKE A FURTHER 
10 INSTRUCTION IF THE COURT WANTS THAT. IN NO WAY CAN 
11 ANYONE CONDONE SUCH A THING, BUT I AM NOT SURE 
12 THAT'S APPROPRIATE. WE KEEP DIGGING THE PIT AND 
13 MAKING IT WORSE. 
14 THE COURT: THE MORE WE FOCUS ON IT AT THIS 
15 POINT, THE MORE ATTENTION WE DRAW TO IT, IS MY 
16 CONCERN. LET ME SAY ONE MORE THING. I COULD HAVE 
17 TAKEN THE ONE JUROR WHO HEARD IT ASIDE, ON THE 
18 RECORD, TAKING OTHERS OUT. I PURPOSELY CHOSE NOT TO 
19 DO THAT, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT 
2 0 SOMETIMES PEOPLE DO NOT IMMEDIATELY RECALL HEARING 
21 SOMETHING, AND THEN WHEN THEIR MEMORIES ARE 
22 REFRESHED AS TO WHAT IT WAS, THEN THEY THINK, OH, 
2 3 YEAH, I HEARD THAT TOO. AND I DIDN'T WANT THAT 
24 ISSUE TO COME UP. I WANTED TO BE CLEAR THAT 
2 5 WHATEVER WAS HEARD BY ONE, NEEDED TO BE REVIEWED 
1 WITH ALL OF THEM. SO IF THE ONE WOULD REFERENCE IT 
2 TO THE OTHERS, OR IF THAT OCCURRED, THAT THEY 
3 WOULDN'T-- THAT WE WOULD KNOW HOW IT WOULD IMPACT 
4 THEM. AND I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT WE PRESSED THEM 
5 TO FIND OUT WHAT THEY REMEMBERED. 
6 I, FRANKLY, MADE VISUAL OBSERVATIONS, AS 
7 WELL AS MAKING A RECORD AS TO WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT 
8 THE EFFECT OF THE WORDS ON THE JURORS, AND THEY DID 
9 NOT APPEAR, IN MY OPINION -- AND I WILL ASK BOTH 
10 COUNSEL TO COMMENT ON THIS --TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY 
11 IN ANY WAY. 
12 MR. PARKER, WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE 
13 REFERENCE?. 
14 MR. PARKER: I AGREE WITH THAT. NOT ONLY 
15 BECAUSE OF THE WORDS THE JUROR SPOKE, BUT THERE WAS 
16 NO SHAKING OF HEADS, NO EITHER SIGN DISGUST OR 
17 LIGHTHEARTEDNESS ON THE OTHER JURORS' PART. THEY 
18 JUST SAT AND LISTENED. I DON'T THINK IT AFFECTED 
19 THEM AT ALL. 
2 0 THE COURT: MS. REMAL, DO YOU HAVE A 
21 PERSPECTIVE ON THIS FURTHER? 
22 MS. REMAL: I DIDN'T NOTICE THE OTHER 
23 JURORS MAKING ANY PARTICULAR FACIAL EXPRESSIONS ONE 
24 WAY OR THE OTHER. WHICH SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR 
2 5 ANSWER THAT THEY HAVEN'T HEARD ANYTHING. 
MS. REMAL: I HAVEN'T DECIDED HOW I AM 
GOING TO HANDLE THIS. I'M GOING TO THINK ABOUT IT 
FOR FIVE MINUTES BEFORE I MAKE MY RULING. THERE IS 
A TREMENDOUS COST INVOLVED WITH BRINGING IN A NEW 
PANEL. IT'S LIKE $18 PER JUROR, AND WE HAD 
SOMETHING LIKE 2 6 JURORS. AND THEN THERE'S MILEAGE 
COSTS, AND WE HAVE TO START ALL OVER AGAIN TO BRING 
INTO ANOTHER 26. MEANWHILE, THE DEFENDANT IS HELD 
IN JAIL ANOTHER TWO WEEKS, WHICH IS EXTREMELY UNFAIR 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
BUT MY UNDERSTANDING, MR. HALE, IS THAT 
THAT'S WHAT YOU WANT. YOU WANT TO HAVE A NEW JURY 
PANEL BROUGHT IN; IS THAT RIGHT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, I BELIEVE SO. 
THE COURT: WHY? 
THE DEFENDANT: I JUST FEEL THAT THE ISSUE, 
WITH THE WAY IT WAS BROUGHT OUT, HOW EVERYONE--
IT'S JUST IT'S SO EMBEDDED IN THEIR MINDS. 
THE COURT: WHO SAID THAT? 
THE DEFENDANT: IF I WAS ON A JURY, AND I 
WOULD THINK THAT THEY ARE MAKING THIS BIG DEAL OF 
WHAT HAPPENED, AND THAT'S HOW I WOULD FEEL, THAT 
THERE MUST BE A REASON FOR IT. I JUST THINK IT 
WOULD AFFECT ME THAT WAY. AND I'M GOING ALONG WITH 
WHAT MY LAWYER FEELS, AS WELL. AND I'M PUTTING MY 
1 TRUST IN HER HANDS. 
2 THE COURT: AND SHE'S A FINE LAWYER. I 
3 UNDERSTAND WHERE YOU'RE COMING FROM. ALL RIGHT. 
4 THANK YOU, SIR. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS GOING 
5 TO RESULT IN A DELAY IF I GRANT A MISTRIAL, BUT 
6 NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN YOUR HAVING A FAIR 
7 TRIAL. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: YES, MA'AM. 
9 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'M GOING TO TAKE 
10 FIVE MINUTES AND THINK ABOUT THIS. I'M GOING TO ASK 
11 COUNSEL TO STEP OUT. I'M GOING TO ASK SARGEANT 
12 BELTRAN TO TAKE THE DEFENDANT BACK INTO THE HOLDING 
13 CELL. AND I'M GOING TO ASK THE OFFICERS TO REMAIN 
14 BEHIND, AS WELL AS THE COURT REPORTER AND MY TWO 
15 OFFICERS. 
16 (COURTROOM CLEARED AS DIRECTED.) 
17 THE COURT: OKAY. WITHOUT MILEAGE WE ARE 
18 TALKING ABOUT $468. PLUS THAT DOESN'T TAKE INTO 
19 ACCOUNT THE LAWYERS' TIME, MY TIME, COUNSEL'S TIME. 
2 0 NOT ONLY THAT, BUT ALL THE PERSONNEL'S 
21 TIME. AND THEN IT'S NOT JUST $468, IT'S MILEAGE, 
22 WHICH I HAD NO IDEA WHAT IT IS. THEN IT'S DOUBLE 
23 BECAUSE WE'RE DOING IT ALL OVER AGAI IF I GRANT THE 
2 4 MISTRIAL. 


























MISTRIAL, ABOUT AN HOUR, BY THE TIME THIS IS TAKEN 
CARE OF. AND THERE IS A HUGE ISSUE ON APPEAL THAT 
LAWYERS WILL SPEND LOTS OF TIME BRIEFING AND WILL 
ADD TO THE APPELLATE ISSUES THAT GO UP. AND IF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS FINDS THAT I ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE MISTRIAL, IF THAT'S WHAT I DECIDE TO DO, THEN 
THE CASE WILL HAVE TO BE RE-TRIED. 
AND SO THAT WILL HAVE COST US THE EXPENSE 
OF NOT ONLY BRINGING IN ANOTHER JURY AND BRINGING 
THE WITNESSES BACK, BUT WE HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE 
ORDEAL OF TESTIFYING AGAIN. BUT THERE IS A HUGE 
COST IN CONNECTION WITH APPEAL. AND AT THE VERY 
LEAST, THERE'S A HUGE APPELLATE ISSUE. 
I WANT TO MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND HOW 
SIGNIFICANT THIS IS, WHETHER I GRANT THE APPEAL --
OR EXCUSE ME, THE MISTRIAL OR NOT. 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT, OFFICERS? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: YES, MA'AM. 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: YES. 
THE COURT: THIS ISN'T HUMOROUS. 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO 
IN ANY WAY AFFECT THOSE PEOPLE. 
THE COURT: IF YOU WERE BAD OFFICERS, I 
WOULDN'T EVEN BOTHER TALKING ABOUT IT WITH YOU. BUT 
YOU'RE NOT; YOU'RE BOTH VERY FINE OFFICERS. THAT'S 
1 WHY I AM TAKING THE TIME TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU, 
2 BECAUSE I WANT YOU TO BE EVEN BETTER OFFICERS. 
3 IT'S A BIG DEAL, WHATEVER IS SAID AT THE 
4 GATES, BECAUSE PEOPLE PAY ATTENTION TO IT. PEOPLE 
5 IN UNIFORM. AND IN FACT, THE MORE PROFESSIONAL YOU 
6 ARE, THE MORE IT TENDS TO BE OBSERVED. YOU BOTH 
7 APPEAR TO BE, IN MY EXPERIENCE, VERY FINE OFFICERS. 
8 SO I'M TAKING THE TIME TO TELL YOU THIS 
9 CANNOT EVER OCCUR AGAIN. AND YOU NEED TO TELL YOUR 
10 COLLEAGUES, THAT WHAT THEY SAY, EVEN IN A 
11 LIGHTHEARTED, JOKING MANNER, IS NOT INSIGNIFICANT. 
12 OBVIOUSLY THE PUBLIC IS GOING TO PAY 
13 ATTENTION TO IT, AND IT'S GOING TO GET BACK TO ME. 
14 I I DON'T WANT TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL, BUT I ALSO KNOW 
15 AT THIS POINT IT'S GOING TO BE AN ISSUE IF I DON'T. 
16 SO I NEED TO THINK ABOUT IT. AND TWO THINGS I NEED 
17 TO DO IS, I NEED TO QUICKLY DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE AND 
18 TRY TO DO IT IN A WAY THAT CREATES FEWER ISSUES ON 
19 APPEAL. ASSUMING THERE IS A CONVICTION. 
20 OBVIOUSLY, IT COULD ALSO THE IMPACT THE 
21 JURY NEGATIVE TO THE PROSECUTION, WHERE THEY THINK, 
22 GEE, THERE'S AN ISSUE AND MAYBE WE OUGHT TO BEND 
2 3 OVER BACKWARDS TO MAKE SURE WE GIVE HIM THE BENEFITS 
24 OF THE DOUBT. SO I JUST WANT YOU TO BE CLEAR THAT 


























CONTRARY, I HAVE A LOT OF RESPECT 
I KNOW HOW HARD YOUR 
HAVE TIME ON YOUR HANDS WHEN 
REALLY HARD, AND OTHER TIMES 
JOB 
FOR BOTH OF YOU. 
IS. I KNOW YOU 
YOU'RE NOT WORKING 
WHEN YOU'RE REALLY 
UNDER THE GUN, WORKING VERY HARD AND DEALING WITH 
DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX ISSUES. 
PLEASE DON'T DO THIS 
WORD ON THIS? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
APOLOGIES TO THE COURT. 
AGAIN. DO I HAVE YOUR 
YES, 
THE COURT: ENOUGH SAID. 
THE WORD THAT JUDGE LEWIS WAS 




AND MY SINCERE 
BUT PLEASE PASS 
UNKIND ABOUT IT. 
OKAY. THANK YOU, 
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: THANK YOU, MA'AM. 
THE COURT: I'M TAKING FIVE MINUTES TO 
THINK ABOUT IT. 
(COURT IN RECESS BRIEFLY AT 2:3 5 P.M.) 
(COURT RESUMES SESSION AT 2:40 P.M. OUT OF 
THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.) 
THE COURT: OFFICER, 
TAKE THEM OUT IN THE HALL FOR 
CAN 
ONE 
I ASK YOU TO JUST 
MOMENT. JUST ONE 
SECOND. WE'LL BRING THE DEFENDANT IN, AND MAKE SURE 



























(DEFENDANT NOW PRESENT.) 
MR. HALE, I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION. I 
WANT TO TELL YOU AHEAD OF TIME. EXCUSE ME. I HAVE 






TO TELL YOU AHEAD OF TIME, I DON' 
WAY IT'S GOING TO INTERFERE WITH 
TO A FAIR TRIAL. 




AND IF I THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE ANY IMPACT, I WOULD 
HAVE GRANTED 
AND THIS MAY 
THE MOTION. BUT I DON'T THINK IT 
BE AN ISSUE ON APPEAL IF YOU'RE 
CONVICTED. AND YOU MAY NOT BE CONVICTED. 
GIVEN 
SO 1 : HAVE CONSIDERED IT. I JUST FEEL 
THE RESPONSE OF THE ONE JUROR, THAT IT'S 
HAD AN IMPACT. BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW AHEAD 
TIME. 
HAVE 
ALL RIGHT. LET'S BRING IN THE JURY. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE IN PRESENCE OF . 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, COUNSEL AND THE 
BEEN TALKING ABOUT A VARIETY OF ISSUES WE 











ISSUES LIKE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
WE TRY TO COORDINATE WITNESSES ! 
WE CAN GET THEM ON WHEN THEY ARE ABLE TO 
30 
ADDENDUM D 
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Julia DWlesandro 
Cleric of the Court 
1 THAT. 
2 I'D SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THAT IN FACT 
3 IS SOME SUGGESTION THAT IS IMPROPER, AND THAT THAT 
4 CERTAINLY AFFECTS THE WITNESS'S ABILITY TO HAVE AND 
5 INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION OF THE EVENT, THE 
6 IDENTIFICATION. AND I SUBMIT THAT UNDER THOSE 
7 CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT OUGHT TO DISALLOW THE STATE 
8 FROM HAVING MR. LEWIS TESTIFY TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN 
9 HIS INITIAL IDENTIFICATION IN THE PHOTO- SPREAD. 
10 BECAUSE I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THE LINEUP AND 
11 THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION, ALL OF WHICH TOOK PLACE 
12 AFTER DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN'S STATEMENT THAT, "YOU 
13 PICKED THE RIGHT SUSPECTS IN THE OF PHOTO- SPREAD, " 
14 WOULD HAVE TAINTED THOSE LATER IDENTIFICATIONS. 
15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IT IS CLEAR FROM 
16 THE CASE LAW, AND I AM REFERRING NOT ONLY TO 
17 RAMIREZ, BUT ALSO TO STATE VERSUS NELSON, THE 
18 EARLIER CASE OF STATE VS LONG, AS TO THE COURT'S 
19 CONSIDERATION OF THE RELIABILITY OF EYE-WITNESS 
20 IDENTIFICATION, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS FOR 
21 THE COURT TO CONSIDER BEFORE EYE-WITNESS 
22 IDENTIFICATION DATA IS PRESENTED TO THE FINDER OF 
2 3 FACT. 
2 4 WE HAVE AN UNUNUSUALLY CLEAR, ARTICULATE 



















































1 ON THE DATE AT ISSUE. HE APPEARS TO BE A SUPREMELY 
2 INTELLIGENT MAN, WHO HAD AN ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF TIME 
3 TO SLEEP, WHO WAS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS 
4 THAT WOULD HAVE INTERFERRED WITH HIS CAPACITY TO 
5 OBSERVE, TO REMEMBER. 
6 HE ALSO TESTIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT 
7 WITH SOMEONE WHO PAID CAREFUL ATTENTION AND WAS 
8 FOCUSED ON WHAT WAS OCURRING. THE COURT ALSO NOTES 
9 THAT WE ARE NOT LOOKING AT WHAT I WOULD CALL A 
10 SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS. THAT IS, AT THE 
11 SHOW-UP PROCESS. BUT RATHER THE MORE STANDARD AND 
12 PERMISSIBLE PROCESS OF FIRST COMMENCING WITH THE 
13 DESCRIPTION, FOLLOWED BY A PHOTO-SPREAD. 
14 AND IN THIS CASE THE COURT NOTES THE 
15 PHOTO-SPREAD IS IS SIX SIMILARLY COLORED 
16 PHOTOGRAPHS, WHICH I THINK IS MORE LIKELY TO YIELD A 
17 FAIR DETERMINATION AS TO IDENTIFICATION. 
18 THAT IS FOLLOWED BY A LINEUP INVOLVING 
19 EIGHT SIMILAR INDIVIDUALS, WITH SIMILAR COLORING, 
2 0 STATURE, SIMILAR RACE, ETC. THE WITNESS HAS FURTHER 
21 ATTESTED TO GOOD LIGHTING THROUGHOUT WHAT WAS A LONG 
2 2 ENCOUNTER. 
2 3 WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT LESS THAN A MINUTE, 
24 ONE PERSON LOOKING AT ANOTHER OVER THE COUNTER IN A 
2 5 CONVENIENCE STORE. RATHER, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A 
1 SCENARIO THAT INCLUDES A VARIETY OF OPPORTUNITIES TO 
2 OBSERVE OVER A FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME. 
3 THERE'S BEEN NOTHING IN THE WITNESS'S 
4 DEMEANOR TO SUGGEST THAT ANY FEAR HE MIGHT HAVE FELT 
5 HAS RESULTED IN CONFUSION. AS MR. PARKER HAS 
6 POINTED OUT, THE WITNESS'S SPEECH WAS CALM, PRECISE, 
7 LOGICAL, THOUGHTFUL, AND CLEAR, IN HIS DESCRIPTIONS 
8 OF WHAT HE HE OBSERVED AND IN HIS RECOLLECTION, AND 
9 SO FORTH, OF THE SAME. 
10 THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE WITNESS 
11 HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW THE ACTOR DURING 
12 THE EVENT AND LEADING UP TO THE EVENT, THAT THE 
13 WITNESS PAID A HIGH DEGREE OF ATTENTION TO THE ACTOR 
14 AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF 
15 THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT HE IS A 
16 RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN WITH GOOD JUDGMENT AND GREAT 
17 CAPACITY TO OBSERVE AND REMEMBER. 
18 THAT HE DOES IN FACT TESTIFY TO HIS 
19 CAPACITY TO OBSERVE THE EVENTS, AND HIS STATEMENTS, 
20 AS WELL, REFLECTED THAT, THAT HE HAD NO PHYSICAL OR 
21 MENTAL LIMITATION. ON THE CONTRARY, HE HAD PHYSICAL 
2 2 AND MENTAL ACCUITY. 
2 3 THAT THE IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE IN A 
24 RESPONSIBLE MANNER THAT IT BEGAN WITH HIS 


























THAT DESCRIPTION IN ANY PARTICULAR MANNER OR 
ATTEMPTING TO SUGGEST A CERTAIN 
APPROPRIATE OR CONSISTENT. 
DESCRIPTION WOULD BE 
THE MERE FACT THAT OFFICER TIMMERMAN MAY 
HAVE SAID TO HIM, AFTER HIS IDENTIFICATION, AND 
AFTER HIS DESCRIPTION, THAT HE HAD PICKED A PERSON 
THAT THEY ALSO BELIEVED MIGHT BE 
THIS COURT'S MIND DID NOT IN ANY 
IDENTIFICATION. 
IT WAS NOT PRIOR TO; IT 
THE IDENTIFICATION. IT IS CLEAR 
THE INDIVIDUAL, TO 
WAY TAINT THAT 
WAS SUBSEQUENT TO 
WHEN THE WITNESS 
WAS BROUGHT IN FOR THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE IT 
WAS IS NOT SO FAR AFTER THE THE 
MEMORY WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED. 
CLOSE IN TIME, AS WAS THE LINEUP 
EVENT THAT HIS 
RATHER, IT WAS 
AND THERE WAS NO 
IMPERMISSIBLE SUGGESTION PRIOR TO THE PHOTO-SPREAD 
OR THE LINEUP SUCH AS, "THE PERSON'S IN THE THE 
SPREAD; PICK THEM OUT," OR, "THE 
LINEUP; PICK THEM OUT." 
PERSON'S IN THE 
RATHER, IT WAS A GENERAL STATEMENT, "WE'D 
LIKE YOU TO LOOK AT THIS AND SEE 
THE PERSON OR PERSONS THAT WERE 
NOT IMPERMISSIBLE. AND, FURTHER 
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS, TAKEN 
INDICATES TO THE COURT THAT THE 
IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY 
INVOLVED." THIS IS 
, ALL OF THE 
IN IT'S TOTALITY, 
EVENT WAS OBSERVED 
1 CLEARLY AND CAREFULLY BY THE WITNESS, THAT THERE IS 
2 A STRONG LIKELIHOOD, CONSISTENT WITH HIS TESTIMONY, 
3 THAT HE WAS ABLE TO PERCEIVE, REMEMBER, AND RELATE 
4 WHAT WAS OBSERVED. 
5 THE FACTORS THAT IMPACT OBSERVATION, 
6 INCLUDING LIGHTING, TIME OF OBSERVATION, LENGTH OF 
7 OBSERVATION, ANY BIASES, INTERFERRENCE, HAVE ALL 
8 BEEN CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT, AND THE COURT FINDS 
9 NO BIAS, NO INTERFERENCE WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE 
10 OR THE CAPACITY TO REMEMBER. 
11 THERE ARE NO RACIAL COMPONENTS HERE. AND 
12 IN SHORT, THE COURT FINDS THAT WHILE THIS IS AN 
13 ISSUE OF FACT, NELSON AND RAMIRIZ MADE CLEAR THAT 
14 THE COURT MUST MAKE AN INITIAL INDICATION OF WHETHER 
15 THE EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IS RELIABLE. AND 
16 THIS COURT DETERMINES AT THIS TIME THAT IT IS A 
17 RELIABLE EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
18 BASED UPON THE FACTORS I'VE INDICATED. 
19 THAT IS TO SAY, THE FINDERS OF FACT WHO LISTEN TO 
2 0 THIS EVIDENCE COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE WITNESS HAS 
21 IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT, AND THERE ARE MANY FACTORS 
22 THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED IN THE JURY MAKING SUCH AN 
23 ASSESSMENT. THERE IS NOT A PAUCITY OF EVIDENCE HERE 
24 OR THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITY FOR IDENTIFICATION. 
2 5 TO THE CONTRARY. THE WITNESS, FURTHER, HAS 
1 SUFFICIENT AGE TO HAVE LIFE EXPERIENCES THAT WOULD 
2 AID HIM IN MAKING AN IDENTIFICATION. 
3 IN OTHER WORDS, HE'S NOT, IF YOU WILL 
4 EXCUSE ME FOR USING THE PHRASE THAT'S SO REPUGNANT I 
5 TO MY DAUGHTER, HE'S NOT A KID. HE'S NOT AN ELDERLY 
6 PERSON WITH SIGHT PROBLEMS, BUT RATHER A PERSON OF 
7 MODERATE TO YOUNG AGE WHO IS IN AN EXCELLENT 
8 POSITION TO MAKE AN IDENTIFICATION. 
9 AND THE COURT FURTHER INCLUDES THAT THE 
10 IDENTIFICATION WAS INDEPENDENT OF ANY SUGGESTIVE 
11 PROCEDURES, ATTITUDES, OR STATEMENTS BY LAW 
12 ENFORCEMENT. I WILL FURTHER CONSIDER THESE SAME 
13 FACTORS AS THE TESTIMONY IS ADDUCED, BUT I HAVE MADE 
14 THESE FINDINGS AT THIS TIME BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY 
15 I HEARD TODAY AND MY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE 
16 SAME. 
17 WE HAD A DESCRIPTION, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT ONLY 
18 RELATIVE TO HEIGHT AND LIGHTING, BUT AS TO THE 
19 COLORING OF THE DEFENDANT, HIS STATURE, HIS FACIAL 
20 HAIR, THE COLOR OF HIS HEAD HAIR, CERTAIN SPECIFIC 
21 CHARACTERISTICS ABOUT HIS EYES. 
22 AND ALL OF THIS CAUSED THE COURT TO BELIEVE 
23 THAT THE WITNESS IS A PERSON WHO IS CREDIBLE, AND TO 
24 WHOM THE JURY COULD LOOK FOR RELIABLE TESTIMONY, AND 


























1 MR. PARKER: I DO NOT. 
2 MS. REMAL: I DON'T. 
3 THE COURT: WHAT I'M GOING TO DO IS WHAT I 
4 BELIEVE I SUGGESTED TO YOU BOTH BEFORE. I WILL ASK 
5 THE VOIR STOCK VOIR DIRE, WHICH INCLUDES SOME OF 
6 WHAT YOU HAVE ASKED FOR, OR BOTH SPECIFICALLY ASKED. 
7 AND THOSE QUESTIONS YOU MAY ASK YOURSELF, 
8 OR YOU MAY FOLLOW-UP ON ANY QUESTIONS THE COURT ASKS 
9 OR REMIND THE COURT, EITHER BY ASKING THEMSELVES OR 
10 ASKING ME TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS THAT ARE LOGICAL BY 
11 WAY OF FOLLOW-UP THAT I MAY NOT HAVE ASKED. 
12 IN OTHER WORDS, MY PURPOSE IS TO LET YOU BE 
13 INVOLVED IN THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS. I HAVE 
14 INSTRUCTIONS. YOU MAY CERTAINLY SUPPLEMENT THEM AS 
15 WE GO THROUGH. I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANYTHING 
16 FURTHER AT THIS TIME IN TERMS OF TIMING, SO WE'LL 
17 COMMENCE AS NINE IN TERMS OF PICKING A JURY. WE'LL 
18 MOVE AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN, MAKING SURE THAT WE TAKE 
19 THE TIME WE NEED TO. I EXPECT TO HAVE A JURY AND DO 
20 OPENINGS BEFORE THE NOON RECESS. WE'LL PROBABLY NOT 
21 HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CALL WITNESS UNTIL THE 
22 AFTERNOON. 
23 MY HABIT IS GENERALLY TAKE AN HOUR AND A 
24 HALF FOR LUNCH, AND GENERALLY BREAK AROUND FIVE OR 

































MORNING AND A 
WE'LL 
TRY TO 
GO A LITTLE LATER. BUT 
STOP AROUND NOON. BUT I TRY TO 
TO COUNSEL'S SUGGESTION, AND ALSO TO 
SCHEDULE. IF WE'RE CLOSE TO FINISHING 
I LIKE 
WE WILL 
TO DO THAT BEFORE WE TAKE OUR 
TAKE A SHORT BREAK IN THE 
. SHORT BREAK IN THE AFTERNOON, AS WELL. 
ON TUESDAY, 




WE'LL LIKELY START AT 8:30 




INCLUDES ABOUT EIGHT, 
HOW MANY WITNESSES, TOTAL, WILL 
TRIAL? 
WELL, MY ACTUAL WITNESS LIST 
BUT THE ONES THAT I'M ASSUMING 
WE'LL GO FORWARD WITH, BARRING SOME CHANGE, IS JUST 





NOT HAVE MADE 





I ANTICIPATE TWO OR THREE. 
OKAY. AND I KNOW THAT YOU MAY 
THIS DETERMINATION, OR MAY NOT BE 
PREPARED TO DIVULGE THE INFORMATION, WHICH YOU DON'T 
NEED TO, BUT HAVE YOU MADE A DETERMINATION AS TO 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WILL BE TESTIFYING? 






























AND, FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, I HAVE 
HIM THAT I THINK WE OUGHT TO MAKE THAT 
FINALLY ONCE THE STATE HAS COMPLETED 
THE 
JUST THOUGHT 
IT MIGHT BE ] 






CERTAINLY THAT'S UP TO YOU. I 
' HAD A PERCEPTION AT THIS ! 
WE SHALL OBVIOUSLY LET ' 
POINT, 
rou 
RIGHT TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION WHEN 
IT APPROPRIATE. 
WHAT I AM 
MAKE KNOWN ANY AND 
THE SAME 
IN? 
ASKING IS THAT, MR. PARKER , YOU 
ALL WITNESSES YOU MIGHT CALL. 













HOW MANY JURORS DO WE HAVE 
WE HAVE ORDERED 27. 
TWENTY-SEVEN. AND TO MY 
CASE RECEIVED A LITTLE BIT 
A LARGE AMOUNT. 
I THINK THAT'S ACCURATE. 
SO I THINK THAT'S A GOOD 








: NOT I. 
NO. 































MS. REMAL I DON'T-
MR. PARKER: I DON'T THINK WE NEED IT. I 
THINK THIS WILL BE A DAY-AND-A-HALF TRIAL. 
THE COURT: SO UNLESS WE RUN INTO A PANEL 
OF JURORS THAT ALL LOOK LIKE THEY MAY HAVE 
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS, WE WON'T PICK AN ALTERNATE. 
BUT I WILL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO KIND OF USE MY 
INSTINCTS ON THAT. AND I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO 
SEEING YOU BOTH ON MONDAY. IS THERE ANYTHING 
FURTHER? 
MS. REMAL: NOPE. 
MR. PARKER: NO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND ANY CLOTHES ISSUE 
THE DEFENDANT? 
MS. REMAL: THEY'RE ALREADY HEAR IN THE 
BUILDING. 
THE COURT: GREAT. WE'LL LOOK FORWARD TO 
SEEING YOU, THEN, ON MONDAY. THANK YOU. WE'RE IN 
RECESS. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 5:15 P.M.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND 
REPORTER AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH HEREBY CERTIFY: 
THAT I AM AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
THAT I WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE 
10 I PROCEEDINGS IN THE BEFORE-ENTITLED CAUSE; 
11 THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED 
12 STENOGRAPHICALLY BY ME, AND WERE THEREAFTER 
13 TRANSCRIBED. 
14 THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE 
15 BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE 
16 PROCEEDINGS HAD. 
17 IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY 
18 | NAME AND SEAL THIS 5TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2000. 
19 
20 
21 | GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR, RPR 
22 
23 
24 
25 
